In reply to Driven5 :
That's funny.
In reply to Driven5 :
That's funny.
Fueled by Caffeine said:This is an uniformed comment. The 737, 757, 767, 747 and 777 all only have two AOA's. The same AOA's that are on the max in the same configuration. Millions and millions of safe flight hours.
airbus considers aoa's safety critical (they use three) same with embraer with their four smart probes(smart probes do speed/aoa/pitch roll/ altitude). Boeing does not( or at least did not pre max) there were other procedures developed so that a pilot could develop attitude.
the main issue was with the lack of training for the pilots. Pilots didn't know what was going on and therefore could not correct.
Assuming you meant "uninformed" comment, which I will fully admit to. However, if the concept of MCAS was to allow the aircraft to be sold to companies without further training, then which had a higher cost: additional training or an extra sensor. I understand that "we've always used 2 sensors, it will be fine" but they introduced a new system to compensate for changes with the new engines. That system depended on proper AoA status. This is alot like the Baltimore bridge thing. We all can look at it in hindsight and think "why in the world would they do that!?" but they operated out of best practices, I suppose.
The article above (Was MCAS even needed?) was a really good read. Definitely helped me understand more fully what occurred on Boeing's side of things.
Back to the original question in the topic: If manufacturers give us additional systems to make us safer, make our job easier, or save us (or them) money, then is it their responsibility to ensure that the users are able to understand how the system functions? Or what to do when it doesn't?
jmabarone said:However, if the concept of MCAS was to allow the aircraft to be sold to companies without further training, then which had a higher cost: additional training or an extra sensor.
This is muddling things again. The purpose of MCAS was to allow the aircraft to be certified--you can't have an aircraft with a pitch-up tendency near a stall. Period. Training won't mitigate that.
The "uninformed" comment was, I think, about me--I claimed that a 3rd AoA sensor was an option, which is not true.
Let's go back to the layers of the onion. The purpose of MCAS was to allow the aircraft to certified. The way it was implemented was intended to allow the aircraft to be sold to companies without further training. And had it actually been implemented correctly*, much like the other existing control augmentation systems (737NG's STS and KC-46's MCAS), there would never have been anything to talk about here in the first place.
I could definitely see this type of thing happening with auto manufacturers, because in my opinion it already has before, is now, and will again. The critical difference is that each incident is statistically FAR smaller and results in FAR fewer deaths, if any at all. So it attracts a LOT less attention before (and after) it's fixed via a recall, TSB, or 'over the air update'... If the actuaries determine it meets the threshold of fixing at all, because business and finance.
*AoA redundancy, pilot override capability, and not-more-than-intended authority
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