Metallugist gets caught falsifying test results.

As a plank owner-shellback Submariner and former Lead Technician in a weapons research lab, this is upsetting.   There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of.  We have a machine that brings metal to near anneal temps, the we introduce a Liquid Nitrogen atmosphere and drop it down to -190*f.  Testing landing gear on the C-130s that go to Antarctica.  "Ah, that'll never happen".  Perhaps the new Class of sub goes deeper and colder than even you can imagine, but that's outside the scope of your math decisions.

Well sign here Honey and go to prison for life when you take out a large plane full of soldiers or a submarine  drills into the bottom of the Marianas Trench. 

In war time, these moves would be treason and it's firing squad time.

In reply to 914Driver :

I offloaded those C-130s on the ice runway when I was working summer support at McMurdo Station way back in 1982-83.  As I recall those were the oldest C-130s in the inventory back then, and the only ones ever outfitted with skis.  Small world it is. 

914Driver said:

There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

This is one of the biggest issues with this disturbing account.  Some phenomena are too complex to be modeled with precision, so engineers build in some "breathing room" in terms of extra strength or durability.  Testing to a degree that seems unreasonable may be a way of ensuring other uncertainties in the design won't cause a catastrophic failure.

To put this a little in perspective.The Thresher was 1300 fathoms (1 fathom is 6') under a submarine that was already at 600' and people were still alive. That is incredible.

I would appreciate a hardcore, "stupid" requirement for the materials used in such a harsh environment.

Thresher passed 4200ft. and still intact, well below the boat's "test depth".  Thanks some engineer-metallurgist for the failsafe overbite.  The Thresher is what started the SUBSAFE program;  an overseer of safety stuff.  I believe the Thresher and Scorpion were only two of four in noncompliance at the time.  SUBSAFE quadrupled  refresh time in port.

"I heard" the Scorpion's Mk 37 infamous silver-zinc batteries overheated and self launched a torpedo in the tube.  I also heard the Thresher was  deep and tried an emergency blow which dumps  ALL the air in the air tanks into the ballast tanks, forcing water out.  You shoot to the surface like a bar of soap!  All that compressed air hit the two ball valves and they iced up, can't close them so sea water rushed in....

So I heard ....

914Driver said:

...All that compressed air hit the two ball valves and they iced up, can't close them so sea water rushed in....

Sounds like one of those "You don't know what you don't know" kind of things.

914Driver said:

  There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

I recently did a job with the apprentice. We could have shortcutted the procedure, saved a lot of time, and likely would have been fine. But I wouldn't let it happen, and he asked, why do we have to do all this stupid E36 M3? I told him it didn't matter why, it's the procedure, and we have to do it. There are things at play here that neither of us understand or can anticipate.

Hopefully he learned from it

aircooled said:

914Driver said:

...All that compressed air hit the two ball valves and they iced up, can't close them so sea water rushed in....

Sounds like one of those "You don't know what you don't know" kind of things.

There is an article on Wikipedia which mentions the problem of icing up of valves in submarines because of moisture in the compressed air system.  The article mentions that air dryers were added to other submarines.      USS Thresher (SSN-593) - Wikipedia

Joule-Thompson effect cooling occurs when a restriction causes a gas to accelerate, this lowers the pressure and cools the gas.   Like when you take the valve stem out of a tire valve - the air rushing out feels cooler, because it is, because of this phenomenon.  

Moisture in the gas freezes the valve until there is zero flow.       So this happening to Thresher is not out of bounds; proving it is another thing.

In reply to 914Driver :

In the case of Thresher a series of events resulted in the loss of the ship, the icing of the EMBT control valves was one of them.  When the control valves iced up the air in the high pressure storage tanks was not able to get to the ballast tanks to push the water out.  The flooding was a separate event.  

From my work at EB many years ago I’m somewhat familiar with the likely chain of events and have typed and edited this reply several times now.  I think the best way to leave it is the end result was a complete re evaluation of critical systems design and testing (SUBSAFE) along with major changes to how the propulsion systems could be operated in other than normal situations.    129 souls were onboard Thresher when she was lost almost 59 years ago April 10, 1963.  

Peabody said:

914Driver said:

  There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

I recently did a job with the apprentice. We could have shortcutted the procedure, saved a lot of time, and likely would have been fine. But I wouldn't let it happen, and he asked, why do we have to do all this stupid E36 M3? I told him it didn't matter why, it's the procedure, and we have to do it. There are things at play here that neither of us understand or can anticipate.

Hopefully he learned from it

The challenge here is that kids for a few generations running here have been told to question authority and the status quo. To some extent I agree, and it would be best if we had an engineering answer to this sort of question/problem, but sometimes- all the time,  you have to push the 'I believe' button and do it per the specs. 

Teh E36 M3 said:

Peabody said:

914Driver said:

  There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

I recently did a job with the apprentice. We could have shortcutted the procedure, saved a lot of time, and likely would have been fine. But I wouldn't let it happen, and he asked, why do we have to do all this stupid E36 M3? I told him it didn't matter why, it's the procedure, and we have to do it. There are things at play here that neither of us understand or can anticipate.

Hopefully he learned from it

The challenge here is that kids for a few generations running here have been told to question authority and the status quo. To some extent I agree, and it would be best if we had an engineering answer to this sort of question/problem, but sometimes- all the time,  you have to push the 'I believe' button and do it per the specs. 

At the same time, it's also a good idea to explain what the requirements are for.  IMHO, it's always a good plan to question and explain requirements- so that they can evolve with additional knowledge.

And this one area where the metallurgist really falls apart- ignoring what was thought as useless requirements as opposed to questioning them and understanding why they are in place- which can lead to the evolution of a more effective requirement.

11GTCS said:

In reply to 914Driver :

129 souls were onboard Thresher when she was lost almost 59 years ago April 10, 1963.  

 

I work with some of the descendants and I am a fully SUBSAFE supervisor that has to put his signature on documents that certify a boat before it sails again. My signature is my integrety. 

Teh E36 M3 said:

Peabody said:

914Driver said:

  There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

I recently did a job with the apprentice.... he asked, why do we have to do all this stupid E36 M3? I told him it didn't matter why, it's the procedure, and we have to do it.

The challenge here is that kids for a few generations running here have been told to question authority and the status quo.

The time to Question Authority in this case was during the specification process for determining the testing procedures.

Once the spec is written and the contract is signed, YOU DO WHAT IS IN THE CONTRACT.  Period.  No further questions.  At the very least, no going rogue about it.

I was taught if you have issues with a command or job, just do the job and file later.  You can get in more trouble refusing.

Falsifying Gov't documents?  Sorry, I'm too cute to go to jail.

Oops.

In reply to 914Driver :

Unless you think that the command or job is making you do something morally reprehensible or illegal... But then we're having an entirely different conversation, and even there, you shouldn't just do it your own way. 

Duke's take on this is absolutely correct. 

We are taught to have a questioning attitude.

In reply to preach (dudeist priest) :

Yes, but see the two posts above.

When I started my apprenticeship on Navy Nukes, in the early '80s, I had to sign a document saying I understood that I would be involved in work that was important enough to count as treason if miss handled, and certain conditions could result in punishment by death. Made quite an impression on the young man that I was!

Someone posted that skipping the test, and falsifying results were the same... not quite. Both lead to the same place, but one shows lazy and corrupt. The other shows intentional deceit and willingness to be corrupt. Both have SEVERE repercussions. 

In reply to 03Panther :

Nuke Navy?  Did you ever serve time in the Idaho desert?  

alfadriver said:

Teh E36 M3 said:

Peabody said:

914Driver said:

  There are ALWAYS variables you are not aware of. 

I recently did a job with the apprentice. We could have shortcutted the procedure, saved a lot of time, and likely would have been fine. But I wouldn't let it happen, and he asked, why do we have to do all this stupid E36 M3? I told him it didn't matter why, it's the procedure, and we have to do it. There are things at play here that neither of us understand or can anticipate.

Hopefully he learned from it

The challenge here is that kids for a few generations running here have been told to question authority and the status quo. To some extent I agree, and it would be best if we had an engineering answer to this sort of question/problem, but sometimes- all the time,  you have to push the 'I believe' button and do it per the specs. 

At the same time, it's also a good idea to explain what the requirements are for.  IMHO, it's always a good plan to question and explain requirements- so that they can evolve with additional knowledge.

And this one area where the metallurgist really falls apart- ignoring what was thought as useless requirements as opposed to questioning them and understanding why they are in place- which can lead to the evolution of a more effective requirement.

Or, a more educated metallurgist.

Close to 50 years ago I had the opportunity to visit a large welding operation in Montreal as part of my metallurgy studies. They were manufacturing hull sections for some US submarines. We didn't get into the particulars of the steel (probably classified) but we were walked through the entire welding process. You ought to see the whole deal to weld thick plates, right down to measuring the length of each weld pass (one rod) and counting every single rod butt. Every "X" inches of completed weld was then strapped with an electric heater and the weld was slowly cooled down to room temperature over a period of a day or two. I asked why US sub parts were being made in Canada and was told the first subs built had been done elsewhere and exhibited cracking during preliminary depth testing. Scary E36 M3 if you get it wrong !

alfadriver said:

In reply to 03Panther :

Nuke Navy?  Did you ever serve time in the Idaho desert?  

Civilian contractor. Only worked in VA. Have been to EB (Groton) as a visitor. 
After being on my tools for 6 years, I went in QC, and NNSY was sending folks to the (then still classified) Sub out in the middle of nowhere. I tried to go, but wasn't allowed "cause I didn't have the experience "

Wish I could have. 

Pretty cool that there are quite a few submarine types here.

03Panther said:

alfadriver said:

In reply to 03Panther :

Nuke Navy?  Did you ever serve time in the Idaho desert?  

Civilian contractor. Only worked in VA. Have been to EB (Groton) as a visitor. 
After being on my tools for 6 years, I went in QC, and NNSY was sending folks to the (then still classified) Sub out in the middle of nowhere. I tried to go, but wasn't allowed "cause I didn't have the experience "

Wish I could have. 

We always thought it was amusing to see Navy guys in their normal on ship uniform waiting for one of the busses to take them to the desert.  But it was there for really good reasons.

In reply to alfadriver :

I have seen a picture (and may still have somewhere) of my god father standing next to rickover at a control panel on the bridge of that one, in about '58, IIRC. Radical stuff at the time. 

I imagine a lot of locals didn't pay much attention to what uniform it was. Or knew, and also knew why!

Heard a lot of good stories from folks the got to go.