VolvoHeretic said:
Even India and China have had about enough of Putin's rocking the boat. Time to turn the screws and heat up on India and China. You're either with us or you're against us.
US/China trade: _____$615 Billion
EU/China trade: _____$710 Billion
Russia/China trade: __$147 Billion
Yahoo.com: Putin tells Modi he'll 'stop' the Ukraine invasion he ordered 'as soon as possible' after the Indian leader criticized Russia's war to his face
Brilliant, A little quiet diplomacy and Bob's your uncle.
Hey China, I understand you're kinda in a pickle with over invested real estate?
Just give title to the land owners so they can pass that on to future generations. ( instead of the 80 year leases they now have) They will continue to hold onto that land, make payments they can't afford, and be loyal to those who allowed them to do it!!
frenchyd said:
In reply to Noddaz :
Maybe that's why Bill Gates and other seriously wealthy people are buying farm land?
Granted with the weather and crop prices it's a crap shoot. However once you have the volume you can negotiate terms to clients rather than accept spot market prices. Plus with federal crop insurance, you're pretty much guaranteed a profit or at a minimum break even.
Finally land, they aren't making any more of it. Yet food demand is growing. So the value of your land is always going up. Young wanna be farmers typically don't have the Capitol to buy major land holdings. Instead they have to break off a piece and spend their life trying to get in the big time.
Add the age of the typical farmer and there is a whole bunch of farm land coming on the market as us baby boomers die. 8 billion customers and America is the bread basket of the world?!!!! Pretty solid long term investment.
You can never go wrong buying land.
You can never go wrong buying land.
Unless you try to steal it instead.
Updates.
Shots audible in several districts of Kherson
You might think this potential Ukrainian penetration into Kherson, but it's probably just as likely Russian doing their "war crime" thing while the still can.
Ukrainian aviation conducted airstrikes at 9 gatherings of Russian military and equipment, several bases and 2 positions of air defense units. Ukrainian air defense shot down Su-24 plane, 3 cruise missile and a drone. Ukrainian missile and artillery troops conducted strikes at Russian army reserves at gathering points and at railway station during unloading, - General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine says in the morning report
This is in the western area in the Luhansk district. It seems like is a lot more freedom of operation for the Ukrainian airforce. Perhaps making good use of the HARM anti-radiation missiles?
Looks like attacking military targets in Russia requires attacking civilian targets in Ukraine.
- The discovery of mass graves and torture chambers in liberated Izyum confirm previous ISW assessments that the Bucha atrocities were emblematic of Russian activities in occupied areas rather than an anomaly.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently threatened to expand Russia’s attacks on civilian Ukrainian infrastructure if Ukraine continues reported attacks on military facilities in Russia.
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center warned that Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks in occupied areas between September 17 and September 20.
- Ukrainian forces captured all of Kupyansk City on September 16, continuing offensive operations east of the Oskil River.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly shelled targets in Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast, Russia, overnight on September 15-16.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s occupation headquarters in Kherson, likely using HIMARS, and are continuing ground maneuvers in three areas of Kherson Oblast as part of the ongoing southern counteroffensive.
- Russian administrative officials are rallying around Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s call for “self-mobilization” at a local level to provide additional forces to the Russian military.
- Forced Russian mobilization campaigns are likely depleting male populations in parts of the claimed territory of the Russian proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) along the front lines.
- Immediate and coordinated Russian information responses suggest that Ukrainian partisans may not be responsible for the September 16 assassination of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Prosecutor General and his deputy.
It looks like the Russians are becoming very aware that Kharkiv and the rail links at Donetsk are pretty critical to holding the entire southern area to the point of sacrificing in other areas. Even loosing Kharkiv could quickly return Russia to it's starting point and put Crimea in serious risk.
Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russians may have decided not to defend this area, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated declarations that the purpose of the “special military operation” is to “liberate” Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Prioritizing the defense of Russian gains in southern Ukraine over holding northeastern Ukraine makes strategic sense since Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts are critical terrain for both Russia and Ukraine whereas the sparsely-populated agricultural areas in the northeast are much less so. But the continued Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, which are using some of Russia’s very limited effective combat power at the expense of defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives, might indicate that Russian theater decision-making remains questionable.
In reply to aircooled :
I heard rumour of FSB agents and Russian soldiers shooting at each other.
Some more info on the gunfire in the streets of Kherson:
Ukrainian officials denied the involvement of Ukrainian forces in a street shooting in downtown Kherson City on the night of September 17 and September 18.[35] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command claimed that the shooting was a Russian provocation.[36] Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian security services have previously warned civilians of possible Russian provocations in populated areas between September 17 and September 20 and claimed that the shooting in Kherson City is a Russian attempt to discredit Ukrainian forces.[37] Advisor to the head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhailo Podolyak noted that Russian street fights indicate that there are boiling tensions between the personnel of private military companies, Russian Armed Forces, Chechen units, and elements of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) amidst the pressure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[38] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Military Administration Serhiy Khlan suggested that the incident was “a cheap spectacle,” and noted that Russian occupation authorities are seeking to create a propaganda narrative that Russian forces are able to maintain control of the city.[39] Russian proxy authorities denied the involvement of Ukrainian sabotage groups and did not provide any additional details.[40] The initial Russian proxy denial makes the assessment that that incident was part of an information operation to discredit Ukrainian forces less likely. The incident may instead indicate that Russian forces are struggling to retain control of the city, possibly because of the infighting Podolyak suggests is prevalent.
General update, not a lot of good new for the Russians here:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be increasingly relying on irregular, poorly trained ad-hoc volunteer and proxy units rather than attempting to rebuild damaged or destroyed conventional Russian ground forces units.
- Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions on the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast despite Russian efforts to contain them.
- Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast may be attempting to fall back to more defensible positions in a controlled withdrawal to avoid the chaotic retreat that characterized the collapse of Russian defenses in Kharkiv earlier in September.
- Russian forces suffered devastating losses of manpower and equipment in their fight for eastern Ukraine and especially during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. Multiple Russian armored and mechanized units have likely been effectively destroyed according to assessments released on September 18.
I found this detail interesting
The formation of such ad-hoc units will lead to further tensions, inequality, and an overall lack of cohesiveness between forces. Ukrainian and Russian sources have reported instances of Russian Armed Forces refusing to pay veteran benefits, one-time enlistment bonuses, or provide medical treatment to BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) servicemen.[6] Some military formations offer financial incentives for every kilometer that the serviceman’s unit advances, an incentive that few soldiers will likely benefit from considering that Russian forces are on the defensive almost everywhere apart from the areas around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, where gains have been slow and very limited.[7] Russian opposition publication Insider reported instances of ethnic discrimination within Chechen units, noting that the Chechen leadership deploys non-Chechens to the frontlines before committing Chechens to the battle.[8] Professional military staff are likely to confront behavioral issues among recruited prisoners, especially considering the likely prevalence of prisoners convicted of violent crimes, narcotics, and rape. The Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR and DNR) have both previously refused to fight for each other’s territory.[9] All these groups have different levels of military training, decentralized command structures, and different perceptions of the war and motivations to fight, which makes conflict and poor unit coordination more probable. The one thing they have in common is wholly inadequate training and preparation for combat.
Kreb (Forum Supporter) said:
I've only run into two types and they don't quite match any of these. One is kind of a blend of C and D, but isn't quite as straightforward about the politics of the situation as C, or at the very least not as open about it. They're steeped in disinfomation like D but it's of a very partisan nature.
Then on the far-left I've run into people sort of like E, they lay most of the blame at NATO's feet and the overarching narrative of their argument is "LEAVE RUSSIA ALOOONEEE! T_T"
Germany provides more:
4 additional mobile howitzers
Per the AP
This I think talks a bit to the fact that the Ukrainians seem to be more active with their airforce... looks like they have been knocking out Russians SAMs in pretty big numbers (again, I suspect the west and the US are helping a lot on this):
Russian forces continue to redeploy air defense systems from sensitive locations likely to support operations in Ukraine. A Finnish news outlet reported on September 18 that its study of publicly available satellite imagery shows that air defense bases in the Zelenogorsk area northwest of St. Petersburg have been partially or fully stripped of their air defense systems over the course of the summer.[69] The outlet noted that most of the systems transferred were older and that their movement was thus unlikely to affect Russia’s ability to defend the area around St. Petersburg materially. This report, combined with earlier reports that Russia had withdrawn S-300 air defense systems from Syria, suggests that the Russian Federation is struggling to sustain air defense operations over Ukraine.[70] Whatever the age or obsolescence of the systems removed from St. Petersburg, their departure at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is constantly warning of the threat NATO poses to Russia (to say nothing of Finland’s imminent accession to the alliance) casts doubt on the seriousness with which Putin takes his own claims of the NATO threat.
Baltic nations close borders
AP
WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania closed their borders Monday to most Russian citizens in response to the wide domestic support in Russia for the war in Ukraine.
This is interesting:
Emerging details about the extent of losses by professional Russian combat units reveal devastating losses rendering elite brigades and regiments combat-ineffective or nearly non-existent. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 18 that the Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) of the Eastern Military District has suffered 90% losses between its fighting around Kyiv and its subsequent operations in eastern Ukraine.[60] The 64th Separate MRB was complicit in war crimes around Bucha and was reportedly sent immediately back into the fight following the Russian withdrawal from around Kyiv to ensure that its personnel would be unable to answer questions about their atrocities.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian MoD had transferred the unit’s remaining equipment to the FSB and was preparing to disband the brigade.[62] The General Staff also reported that the 11th Army Corps of the Baltic Fleet has suffered 50% casualties.[63] An independent Western analyst assessed that the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army lost a regiment’s worth of advanced T-80 tanks during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast, observing that that division only had two regiments to begin with.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian forces had overrun a Russian repair facility in Balaklia during the counteroffensive around Izyum and had seized over 200 modern and in some cases advanced armored vehicles.[65] These losses to some of the Russian Army’s premier conventional armored and motorized rifle units will be impossible to replace in the short term.
Related to the previous post:
Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which is not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers. The legislatures of Russia’s proxies in occupied Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), each called on their leadership to “immediately” hold a referendum on recognizing the DNR and LNR as Russian subjects.[1] Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan spoke glowingly of the call, referring to it as the “Crimean scenario.” She wrote that by recognizing occupied Ukrainian land as Russian territory, Russia could more easily threaten NATO with retaliatory strikes for Ukrainian counterattacks, “untying Russia’s hands in all respects.”[2]
This approach is incoherent. Russian forces do not control all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Annexing the claimed territories of the DNR and LNR would, therefore, have Russia annex oblasts that would be by Kremlin definition partially ”occupied” by legitimate Ukrainian authorities and advancing Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian strikes into Russian-annexed Crimea clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s illegally annexed territory do not automatically trigger Russian retaliation against NATO, as Simonyan would have her readers believe. Partial annexation at this stage would also place the Kremlin in the strange position of demanding that Ukrainian forces unoccupy “Russian” territory, and the humiliating position of being unable to enforce that demand. It remains very unclear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be willing to place himself in such a bind for the dubious benefit of making it easier to threaten NATO or Ukraine with escalation he remains highly unlikely to conduct at this stage.
Relevant article just published:
https://www.vox.com/world/2022/9/20/23362290/russia-ukraine-china-technology-west-war
I have to wonder if Russian information restrictions played a part in making Russians believe that the West has any chance of crying uncle first...
aircooled said:
Related to the previous post:
Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which is not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers. The legislatures of Russia’s proxies in occupied Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), each called on their leadership to “immediately” hold a referendum on recognizing the DNR and LNR as Russian subjects.[1] Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan spoke glowingly of the call, referring to it as the “Crimean scenario.” She wrote that by recognizing occupied Ukrainian land as Russian territory, Russia could more easily threaten NATO with retaliatory strikes for Ukrainian counterattacks, “untying Russia’s hands in all respects.”[2]
This approach is incoherent. Russian forces do not control all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Annexing the claimed territories of the DNR and LNR would, therefore, have Russia annex oblasts that would be by Kremlin definition partially ”occupied” by legitimate Ukrainian authorities and advancing Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian strikes into Russian-annexed Crimea clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s illegally annexed territory do not automatically trigger Russian retaliation against NATO, as Simonyan would have her readers believe. Partial annexation at this stage would also place the Kremlin in the strange position of demanding that Ukrainian forces unoccupy “Russian” territory, and the humiliating position of being unable to enforce that demand. It remains very unclear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be willing to place himself in such a bind for the dubious benefit of making it easier to threaten NATO or Ukraine with escalation he remains highly unlikely to conduct at this stage.
Aside from raising the fairly obvious question of "why didn't they do this earlier?", the annexation ploy could be a prelude to an attempt at a Russian-initiated peace settlement. Erdogan reportedly spoke to Putin and says he wants to end the conflict in the near term. The only way this happens without total defeat is if he can get a negotiated settlement. By annexing Donbas to Russia in spite of Ukraine still controlling most of Donetsk, the thinking could be to use it as a pretext for a land swap deal, with Russia evacuating the remaining portions of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine recognizing Russian control in Donbas and Crimea.
I see little reason why Ukraine would agree to this now. Once it's on the table, however, if Ukraine's offensive slows, or costs rise, there may be more voices calling for a deal. I would suspect the first calls will come from Western Europe, not Ukraine, in an effort to stanch the economic bleeding caused by high energy prices over the winter. All Russia has to do is keep bringing it up the offer while not losing too much more; whether it can do that is an open question.
We're not there yet, but there are parallels to the end of WW1. Wilson's peace efforts in 1917 fell on deaf ears all around, because all sides still thought they had a chance on the battlefield. Only after the failure of Operation Michael, the last great German offensive in the West, did Berlin perform an about-face and happily agree to most of Wilson's proposals. The British and French were completely worn out at this point, and agreed, even though Germany remained in control of virtually all of its territory, plus big gains in the east courtesy of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The nature of the treaty signed in 1919 is another matter entirely, but the Armistice was agreed only because Germany knew it couldn't achieve its war aims, and the Allies were too tired and broke to keep fighting long enough to overrun Germany. Wilson wouldn't have been very happy if they rejected the German overture, and given that the US was basically financing the Allied war effort at this point, they had to listen to him, even if they couldn't stand him.
Just saw that Putin's big speech for tonight has been delayed by a day. Wonder what's going on behind the scenes.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Alternatively it could also be an attempt for a rallying cry to Russian citizens and an excuse to declare full scale war and forced mobilization.
In reply to 93EXCivic :
Possible but not likely. I have serious doubts about the ability of Putin to persuade the Russian middle class of the wisdom of his policy in Ukraine - since it would mean sending their sons - and without them on board, no mobilization is going to go according to plan. The recent recruitment of prisoners suggests he is not willing to take the chance. He cannot afford domestic instability on top of everything else.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Agreed. What I've expected and not yet seen is the faux terrorist thing, like how he set up the Chechens as the fall guys leading to his move into the top spot.
In reply to 02Pilot :
I mean what you say makes sense but neither of us believed Putin would actually invade Ukraine either.
In reply to 93EXCivic :
Without question. I'm presenting my evaluation of the circumstances and possible outcomes, nothing more.
In reply to Kreb:
I think events have moved past the point where such actions would be useful. At this stage targeted assassinations are probably more likely.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Here is my question though. Let's say those regions "vote" to become part of Russia and Russia accepts, how does Putin sell it back home if parts of that is given up as part of peace deal?
In reply to 93EXCivic :
The real question is how much credibility does Putin still have in Russia? If some General ends Putin's rein do the Russians just pack up and head North?
