History in the Making: Russian Invasion

In reply to NOHOME :

I'd assume russsia times would be the place to go to check out their perspective.  Intentionally misspelled in the hopes of keeping trolls away.

I'm reading there are now HIMARS strikes ongoing on front line positions, instead of supply lines/command centers.

There is RT.com and Sputnick.com (which appears to be down now).  As you noted, generally not a lot of realistic info out of those other then perspective (which of course can be useful as long as you understand).

There is an "askarussian" subreddit  on reddit, gives a bit of a glimpse to their perspective. 

The critical part of any Ukrainian offensive in that area will be crossing the Dnieper river, which they have been hitting the bridges for.  It would "seem" like taking Kherson is likely an objective, but do they have a plan to cross the river?

Of note is that Ukraine does hold the east bank of the river to the east (just past the nuke plant, north of Metropol), so I am sure the Russians are keeping a very close eye on that also.  Also a great place to cut off all the Russian forces in the west, including Crimea....

In reply to aircooled :

My assumption would be that the offensive pauses when they hit the river, and they'll start hitting any military target that is newly in artillery range to soften it up for the next round.

The Ukrainian offensive brings up a number of tactical, operational, and strategic issues that it may be useful to address.

Tactically, the Ukrainians have be adopting Western methods designed to fight against forces using Russian doctrine (which looks a lot like Soviet doctrine in many ways). This can be seen in the focus on interdiction and attriting supplies and LOS over the past few weeks. The use of battlefield-level PGMs - HIMARS and guided artillery rounds - has made this possible. Russian manpower and frontline numbers were always a factor that the West could not counter in kind, so they had to come up with other solutions, usually technological ones; the Ukrainians are benefiting from being in a tactically similar situation to the one NATO faced for decades. This has validated many Western decisions in armaments and doctrine, but those lessons are not only going to be absorbed in the West. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Ukrainians can effect the sort of rapid, coordinated counterattack operation that represents the next phase in the Western offensive concept.

Operationally, Kherson is the media focal point, but the real objectives are to throw the Russians back over the Dnipro River, providing both an effective geographical barrier to any counter-counteroffensive, as well as legitimating the Ukrainian claim to river access extending to the Black Sea in any cease-fire in-place that might occur in the immediate future. Behind this effective defensive barrier, the Ukrainians have a perfect staging area for strikes against a number of targets currently out of reach by massed or precision fires: the entirety of the North Crimea Canal, the geographic bottleneck and post-2014 border at Armiansk, dozens of kilometers of the main east-west road from Melitopol, and much more. Crossing the river to continue retaking ground on the south bank is an order of magnitude more difficult unless the Russians truly collapse, and I do not expect the Ukrainians to be planning for it at this stage. An envelopment, thrusting south on multiple axes to the river, then attempting to encircle and collapse the remaining pocket of Russian resistance (preferably keeping them outside the city of Kherson, which could be costly to retake directly), seems most likely.

Strategically, there are some indications that a reverse on the battlefield now would be particularly bad timing for the Russians, who are showing more signs of structural weakness in their long-term ability to maintain their effort. Reports on shortages of PGMs, reductions in available forces for high-profile exercises with China, and limited Western success in dealing with the energy issue all point to a weakening of Russia's ability to leverage the strategic situation in their favor. This does not mean anything in the short term, but Russia will have to be working out how to address these issues now if it wants to arrest the decline. This probably means more cooperation with Iran and China, more efforts to distract or weaken the West with influence operations, cyberattacks, and support for anti-Western insurgencies and rogue states. The weaker Russia gets strategically, the fewer options it has; Western leaders should strongly and actively avoid pushing Russia too far into a corner, where Putin is likely to feel he must fight his way out by any means necessary if he wants to survive. If Russian weakness becomes more pervasive, expect to start hearing more Western voices pushing for a negotiated solution, no matter how unpopular this might be with the Ukrainians, who see near-term Russian weakness as perhaps their only opportunity to restore their territorial integrity. The biggest winner in any prolonged decline in Russian strategic leverage, however, will be China; Xi knows this, and certainly will help Putin continue for as long as he wishes, but only enough to keep fighting (and not enough to significantly endanger China's commercial relations with the West), not to win.

That's an interesting take, about China providing just enough to keep Russia in the fight, but not to win. Some people (with whom I disagree) have expressed similar sentiment about the West and Ukraine. 

In reply to Kreb (Forum Supporter) :

It's not the first time this approach has been suggested. In House Committee hearings in early 1966, Dr Ralph Powell from American University stated:

... The Soviets accusing the Chinese and vice versa of not doing enough to support the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The Chinese rationalization is in part a defense against Moscow's charges. But we should make a very careful distinction between this rationalization for not massively intervening to support "wars of liberalization" and the willingness of the Chinese Communists as demonstrated in Korea to defend their own borders and their basic national and party interests. Remember that in the Korean war they massively intervened when US and UN troops approached their Manchurian frontiers. I assume that their approach to the Vietnam situation would be quite similar. There is a costly protracted war going on there in which the United States is deeply involved. That situation serves Peiping's interests and promotes its policy of attempting to overextend the United States but the situation would change drastically if the war escalated to the point where it threatened the vital interests of Communist China. If the United States were to overthrow the Communist regime in North Vietnam and especially if US Armed Forces were to approach the southern borders of Communist China I would expect the Chinese to react violently. It may be fair and accurate to say that Peiping is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese or even the last foreign revolutionary but it would be dangerous to assume that Communist China will not fight to preserve its own vital interests.

As to the West, I think the distinction between those who would use Ukraine to weaken Russia vice those who want to help them win is how each group views the desired end-state of the conflict, with the latter wanting Ukraine in NATO and tied to an ever-expanding Western structure, and the former wanting to simply weaken Russia to the point that it no longer presents a threat. I'm somewhere in between those two extremes; I think there are benefits to limiting Russia to an extent (while still offering them an opportunity to reorient to a less openly hostile stance toward the West in the mid-term), and I think it is dangerous to facilitate every Ukrainian hope, including joining NATO. As I've stated here before, my ideal end-state for Ukraine is something like postwar Austria: definitively Western oriented in culture and economy, but militarily neutral by treaty (while still Western equipped).

Thoughtful and informative response as usual. Thanks. 

The other thing is simply that there are those who always want a deeper, more vigorous approach to....anything. The USA "lacked the will" to win in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Yada, yada. 

Apparently 4 villages taken back today.  Not a lightning round but steady progress.

That is an important point that needs to be considered at all times, you have to take any info in perspective of where it comes from.  In the current situation (Ukrainian offensive), you can expect little specific info out of the Ukrainians or the west.  Obviously, any info will generally be info that advantages that side, which is a good way to look at info (especially Russian):  "why are they saying / releasing this?"  Sadly, this approach is also useful with most media.

Of note, in the pic at the bottom, the capturing of the villages are being report by Russian sources! (social media, not official).

Apparently Russians jamming satellite pictures of the Kherson region.  Russian installed mayor of Kherson has fled town but is pretending to still be there (geo location has determined he is somewhere else).  Russian collaborators are getting blowed up in noticeable numbers in the area.

Interesting stuff going on, it will just be very difficult in some case to figure out exactly what is going on.   I am expecting some very disappointing performance out of the Russians (I know, big stretch to guess that!)

This is a very interesting (and brave?) track of a Rivet Joint (signals intell, including tracking ground units) that is going on now.  Seemingly VERY close to Crimea.   You can be very sure it is NOT alone out there!

Ukrainian military officials announced the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast on August 29. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces have broken through the first line of defenses in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast and are seeking to take advantage of the disruption of Russian ground lines of communication caused by Ukrainian HIMARS strikes over many weeks.[1] Ukrainian officials did not confirm liberating any settlements, but some Russian milbloggers and unnamed sources speaking with Western outlets stated that Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements west and northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[2] The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD), Russian proxies, and some Russian milbloggers denounced the Ukrainian announcement of the counteroffensive as “propaganda.”[3]

Many Russian milbloggers nevertheless reported a wide variety of Ukrainian attacks along the entire line of contact, and the information space will likely become confused for a time due to panic among Russian sources.[4] Russian outlets have also vaguely mentioned evacuations of civilians from Kherson Oblast, but then noted that occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast are calling on residents to seek shelter rather than flee.[5] ISW will report on the Ukrainian counteroffensive in a new section below.

Some more reading I've done suggests they were trying to convince the Russians they'd be attacking Kherson directly, in order to draw in more troops to the city, and now it looks like they may be attempting to squeeze the city from the sides, giving the occupiers the choice of only retreating across the river without their heavy equipment, or surrendering.  I suspect Russian soldiers will not be as dedicated to holding out as the Ukrainians were in Mariupol.

Here is an interesting perspective.  As a reminder this Russia Today, and certainly should not be considered accurate, and may even be fully false!

https://www.rt.com/russia/561816-russia-ukraine-counter-offensive-losses/

Russian forces have taken out hundreds of Ukrainian troops and dozens of tanks and armored military vehicles after repelling Kiev’s ill-fated offensive in southern Ukraine, which was mounted at the personal order of President Vladimir Zelensky, the Defense Ministry claimed on Tuesday.

So what should you read into this?  Well, maybe they have had some success in defense, potentially ignoring disaster in other areas, but the most important point to be taken is that the Russians are admitting there is an offensive going on.

aircooled said:

Here is an interesting perspective.  As a reminder this Russia Today, and certainly should not be considered accurate, and may even be fully false!

https://www.rt.com/russia/561816-russia-ukraine-counter-offensive-losses/

Russian forces have taken out hundreds of Ukrainian troops and dozens of tanks and armored military vehicles after repelling Kiev’s ill-fated offensive in southern Ukraine, which was mounted at the personal order of President Vladimir Zelensky, the Defense Ministry claimed on Tuesday.

So what should you read into this?  Well, maybe they have had some success in defense, potentially ignoring disaster in other areas, but the most important point to be taken is that the Russians are admitting there is an offensive going on.

At the same time. 

Ukraine is using fake HIMARs to get Russia to waste armaments.

“They’ve claimed to have hit more HIMARS than we have even sent,” one U.S. diplomat observed. 

In reply to Mr_Asa :

A very old trick. British were doing that durng the battle of Britain

In reply to bobzilla :

I was just thinking the same thing. All the inflatables and such used in WW2. I guess some things never go out of style. 

But I was told in YouTube comments by Joeseph Americanman that Ukraine is losing 1200 soldiers a day in Kherson alone!

Yeah, that's pretty common.  The Russians do with their S-300 / 400 SAMs and other stuff.

I want one of these for yard art on Halloween

I wonder if those are made in China? I suppose the trouble with inflatables is that we send a satellite over Ukraine and Russia every day. Do they drag them around every so often? Make fake tire tracks to the missiles? Edit: If we can read a newspaper from space, can't they tell that those a fake?

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

Not all intelligence is collected from state-of-the-art sources. HUMINT is a significant source, and an untrained observer driving past one of these at a distance could easily mistake it for the real thing. How high value the target is, and how desperate the opponent is to destroy it, are going to determine how readily such reports are going to be believed.

For example, Russia wants to kill every HIMARS they can find. They get a report from a collaborator who says they saw one in a particular field near their village. These are highly mobile targets; does Russian intel wait to corroborate before passing it up the chain, potentially missing an opportunity (and being blamed for it), or do they send it up immediately? Once received, do targeting officers wait to confirm or order a strike? What if it's a decoy? Yes, but what if it's real? Either way, you better decide before it moves, comrade. So what's it going to be?

aircooled said:

Yeah, that's pretty common.  The Russians do with their S-300 / 400 SAMs and other stuff.

I want one of these for yard art on Halloween

I forget who did what, but one of my favorite PsyOps type stories from WWII was one side built wooden airstrips with wooden planes and over night the other side dropped wooden bombs on them.

I think the Axis had the wooden planes and the Allies had the wooden bombs.

Stumbled across this Russia Matters piece that lays out in far greater detail than I did the Chinese approach to Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict.

Also worth reading on the same site is this short review of Bill Burns' (current DCI and former US ambassador to Russia) memoir from a couple years ago, specifically focusing on the Russia question vis a vis NATO and Ukraine.

It would be interesting to see the Russian media perspective on this (as questioned above).  I have heard the (government controlled) TV is a great source, but I am not sure you can find it translated.  It should be noted that Russia Today, although clearly a bit of a propaganda outlet for Russia, it is also very much constructed for a western audience.

I suspect, as shown above, that the current narrative that the whole offensive is a massive failure that is bouncing off the iron wall that is the might of the Russian army is still strong.  Once (hopefully) their looses become harder to ignore, I wonder how they will turn it into the story of victimization.  I suspect it will be mostly a focus on how the treachery of the US is responsible for losses (ignoring how superior the Russian forces are to the US of course).

Some updates (still pretty vague):

Ukrainian forces began striking Russian pontoon ferries across the Dnipro River on August 29, which is consistent with the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The effects of destroying ferries will likely be more ephemeral than those of putting bridges out of commission, so attacking them makes sense in conjunction with active ground operations. Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian pontoon-ferry crossing in Lvove, approximately 16km west of Nova Kakhovka on the right bank of the Dnipro River on August 29.[1] Ukrainian and Russian sources have also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a pontoon crossing constructed out of barges near the Antonivsky Road Bridge.[2]

Ukrainian forces have long undertaken efforts to destroy Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) prior to the announcement of the counteroffensive operation, which likely indicates that Ukrainian forces are committed to a long-term effort - composed of both strikes and ground assaults. Ukrainian strikes on Russian GLOCs disrupt the Russians’ ability to supply and reinforce their positions with manpower and equipment, which will assist Ukrainian ground counteroffensives. Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces are continuing to use ferries to transfer a limited amount of military equipment daily via the Dnipro River.[3]

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is thus a cohesive process that will require some time to correctly execute. The Kremlin will likely exploit the lack of immediate victory over Kherson City or Ukrainian operational silence on the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to misrepresent Ukrainian efforts as failing and to undermine public confidence in its prospects.

Russian forces are continuing to react and adjust their positions throughout southern Ukraine, likely both as a response to the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and in preparation for broader Ukrainian counter-offensives further east. Russian forces are continuing to transfer large convoys of military equipment from Crimea and Melitopol.[4] Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov also noted that Russian forces have opened up around five military bases and barracks in Melitopol and will likely continue to prepare defenses around Melitopol given its strategically vital GLOCs between Rostov Oblast and southern Ukraine.[5] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast are attempting to conduct rotations of troops, likely in an effort to reinforce some vulnerable positions.[6]

Mr_Asa said:

 

I forget who did what, but one of my favorite PsyOps type stories from WWII was one side built wooden airstrips with wooden planes and over night the other side dropped wooden bombs on them.

I think the Axis had the wooden planes and the Allies had the wooden bombs.

I had not heard that one.  It's apparently not well documented and has been suspected to be not true, but there are apparently numerous reports from the time of it.

X tells me a funny one. He says the British intelligence in Holland is working fine. Both sides in this war have built a number of dummy airdromes and strewn them with wooden planes. X says the Germans recently completed a very large one near Amsterdam. They lined up more than a hundred dummy planes made of wood on the field and waited for the British to come over and bomb them. Next morning the British did come. They let loose with a lot of bombs. The bombs were made of wood (597).

In 2020, Courouble followed up on his book with a documentary film that features several eyewitness accounts, among them Werner Thiel who told the following version of the story: As a Lieutenant-Colonel, Thiel was stationed at the Luftkriegsschule III, a Luftwaffe school in Werder near Potsdam in 1942. He was deployed to a training airfield in the village of Borkheide 23 kilometers south of Werder. In 1943, wooden aircraft decoys were set up to protect the airfield from an air raid but the next morning, Thiel only found wooden bombs strewn across the areas - they had "wood for wood" written on them.

Ultimately, this story can only be evaluated based on eyewitness accounts and circumstantial sources, but over the years, researchers have presented compelling evidence that pilots did use wooden bombs on enemy decoys as a sort of practical joke - and likely more than once.

https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2021/07/the-story-of-the-wooden-bombs-dropped-on-german-decoy-airfields-is-likely-true.html