History in the Making: Russian Invasion

aircooled said:

 

This does seem to very much speak to the concept that the Russian might be running very thin on resources in areas they are not concentrating on.  It's certainly too soon for this to be a distraction for some other action involving F16's, but you have to wonder if there is another secret "punch" coming up somewhere else also.

 

Both sides have a huge amount of adjoining territory.  There's inevitably going to be soft spots going both ways. I have to think that with our help, Ukraine has the benefit of better intelligence, however. That said, I don't see that this incursion serves any large strategic purpose other than the psychological angle. Coupled with the bombings of their oil infrastructure and airfields, Ukraine is becoming more of an annoyance than ever.

I just learned about the Sudzha gas transfer hub, a major transfer point from Russia to the EU -  that could very well be the reason for the location of the raid. If the Ukrainians intend to blow it up, they are playing a dangerous game; they risk impacting EU economies going into winter, which certainly will not endear them to Western governments (behind closed doors, at least), but the EU put itself in this position, and will get zero sympathy from either Russia or Ukraine. The Ukrainians may also be more desperate than they've been letting on, and willing to take large risks in order to try to tip the balance.

I think the line that go through there goes into Ukraine, so, maybe not a concern on that point.   Sudzha is also a point on a significant rail line that runs to the east, so there are other reasons to take it.

Looks like the Brotherhood line.  If Ukraine wanted to cut that, they can do it from within Ukraine:

It appears as if there were small defense lines where they crossed, but they are very much in the open now.  Based on what the Russians are saying (Ukraine is being VERY quite at this point, for good reason), the Ukrainians used a large number of FPV type drones to pin down an overwhelm the defenses, in combination with significant EW.  The troops followed the drone after the disruption, then repeat.  It sounds a bit like old school artillery doctrine, but obviously FAR more directed and precise.  This might be a model for "modern warfare".  I am sure many are watching in interest.

The Ukrainians are clearly not going to be able to march on Moscow.  As they advance farther, supply and supply lines will become an issue, and they will also become easier targets of air power (harder to shove air defense in the gap).  The Russians have drones also, and the Ukrainians are already showing losses from Lancet style drones.  The article linked above seemed to imply this might be some sort last desperate attempt, but the Russians are still only advancing very slowly in the one spot that they are (with huge effort).  So if the Ukrainians are in a desperate situation, it's certainly not obvious (this of course could be a way to spoof that they are not...)

I guess the real question is:  How far will they go and will they be able to, or want to, hold what they capture?  There is also potential for then to swing west and cut out another chunk of boarder territory that is now partially cut off.  The clock is ticking as Russian rushes to assemble an response force.

02Pilot said:

In reply to aircooled :

Perspective matters here. Imagine if in 1965, in response to Rolling Thunder, the Soviets had given North Vietnam weapons of sufficient range to target US airbases in Thailand (let's say SCUDs with conventional warheads), but stipulated that they could only be used inside Vietnam. Would the NV leadership have wanted to hit Korat and Nakhon Phanom and taken out the fighter-bombers based there? Sure, but consider who the US would have blamed for the attack: not the North Vietnamese, but the Soviets, who provided the weapons and authorized their use against US forces outside of the combat zone. If the North did it on their own, well, that's their prerogative, but if the Soviets colluded with them, it would have been seen as a provocation and perhaps an escalation. Was the Soviet Union trying to escalate the conflict, and what were the risks if they were but the US thought they were not? Could the US afford to dismiss the potential of escalation? On the flip side, did the Soviets want to risk US retaliation, which could have been anything from targeting Hanoi and Haiphong, possibly killing Soviet advisors, to broader efforts like increasing US strategic nuclear forces in Europe and assuming a more active role in trying to roll back Communism in Eastern Europe? And that's just US forces in a third country - imagine the uproar and calls for World War 3 if the North Vietnamese were empowered to hit US soil.

Sometimes playing it safe has more to do with what could happen rather than what is happening. Are the Russians using this to their advantage? Of course they are. But their bluffing is a double-edged sword; while they haven't followed through on their threats yet, the more they feel the pressure of Western assistance impacting their chances of success in Ukraine, and particularly inflicting damage on Russian soil, the greater the chance that their response will be significant and destabilizing, when and if it comes.

This is why war shouldn't be mixed with politics. The simple answer to Russia's 'Red Line' threats should be 'If you don't like it, you're welcome to return to Russia at any time, otherwise GFY' 

The biggest thing that we've learned the last few years is that the closest to parity Russia/USSR has come with the US was likely the late 50's-60's. 

Maybe Ukraine should go Mongol style (Not to be confused with Gangnam style ). Race in, kick some ass, pull out and set a trap for their pursuers. Rinse, wash, repeat.

My thoughts on the side-trip into Kerch is that it was done to make russian citizens aware of the war.

I imagine that russian citizens are aware of the Ukrainian war in  much the same way that I was aware of the Iraq war or the Afghan war; I knew they were happening but did not involve me.  I imagine that had either "foe" landed a force in any town in the USA, I would have felt very involved.

Thing is I imagine the russian citizens will have the same knee-jerk reaction that I would in that situation: "Nuke the Bastards"

BTW - the Ukrainians actions are not an invasion...

....there a Special Military Operation.   

WOW Really Paul? said:

02Pilot said:

In reply to aircooled :

Perspective matters here. Imagine if in 1965, in response to Rolling Thunder, the Soviets had given North Vietnam weapons of sufficient range to target US airbases in Thailand (let's say SCUDs with conventional warheads), but stipulated that they could only be used inside Vietnam. Would the NV leadership have wanted to hit Korat and Nakhon Phanom and taken out the fighter-bombers based there? Sure, but consider who the US would have blamed for the attack: not the North Vietnamese, but the Soviets, who provided the weapons and authorized their use against US forces outside of the combat zone. If the North did it on their own, well, that's their prerogative, but if the Soviets colluded with them, it would have been seen as a provocation and perhaps an escalation. Was the Soviet Union trying to escalate the conflict, and what were the risks if they were but the US thought they were not? Could the US afford to dismiss the potential of escalation? On the flip side, did the Soviets want to risk US retaliation, which could have been anything from targeting Hanoi and Haiphong, possibly killing Soviet advisors, to broader efforts like increasing US strategic nuclear forces in Europe and assuming a more active role in trying to roll back Communism in Eastern Europe? And that's just US forces in a third country - imagine the uproar and calls for World War 3 if the North Vietnamese were empowered to hit US soil.

Sometimes playing it safe has more to do with what could happen rather than what is happening. Are the Russians using this to their advantage? Of course they are. But their bluffing is a double-edged sword; while they haven't followed through on their threats yet, the more they feel the pressure of Western assistance impacting their chances of success in Ukraine, and particularly inflicting damage on Russian soil, the greater the chance that their response will be significant and destabilizing, when and if it comes.

This is why war shouldn't be mixed with politics. The simple answer to Russia's 'Red Line' threats should be 'If you don't like it, you're welcome to return to Russia at any time, otherwise GFY'

The biggest thing that we've learned the last few years is that the closest to parity Russia/USSR has come with the US was likely the late 50's-60's. 

I could not disagree more. Clausewitz correctly understood that "war is policy by other means." If not for political objectives, why are you fighting the war? And if you're not actively fighting, but involved in another way (supporting, militarily or economically, or both, for example), why are you doing it but for political objectives? The US is supporting Ukraine because it is politically useful to do so, just as the Soviets supported the North Vietnamese because of the their political utility in the context of the Cold War.

It has been fashionable to claim that the Vietnam War was lost because politicians ran things rather than military leadership, but this is misleading at best. The military leadership in question had its own objectives, which were strictly correct in a narrow sense, but they did not align with the more important interests of the nation. Put another way, what was more important: winning in Vietnam, or winning the Cold War, bearing in mind that to win the Cold War, first you had to survive. I am not excusing the appallingly poor leadership of the Johnson Administration during that conflict - they certainly bear the lion's share of the blame for the outcome - but at least they understood that losing in Vietnam was preferable to winning World War 3.

In reply to 02Pilot :

I'll give you that at least for the modern sense, it's a side effect of trying to civilize something that shouldn't be. As far as political aims of war should be step 1: win, step 2: set terms, step 3: repeat until terms are met. 
The current idea of 'we can't offend the aggressor too much' is laughable at best and a perfect example of not fighting to win. 
 

I'll skip the rest as it involves deeper diving into political shortsightedness, misplaced idealism, and absolutely idiotic topics. I'd much rather not get this thread locked by hammering too much on the political aspects. 

In reply to WOW Really Paul? :

The problem with this approach remains a simple yet fundamental one: if you haven't defined victory in terms of political conditions, how can you determine when you have won? The vast majority of historical conflicts have ended with settlements, not existential defeat. Unless you a prepared to fight until you have utterly destroyed your opponent (be that a government or a civilization, or anything in between), victory will be based upon a minimum set of political - not military - objectives; if you don't know what these are before initiating combat, how can you know when you've gotten what you wanted?

Going back to the Vietnam analogy, the Soviets were primarily concerned with weakening US standing in the world (particularly the non-aligned countries and those with a recent history of colonialism) and diverting defense resources away from Europe, while the US was trying to contain Communism and reassure its allies of its commitment; neither one particularly cared about the fate of Vietnam itself. At no point was there even the slightest thought in Moscow of trying to overthrow the US government or its leadership, nor in Washington of retaliating against the Soviets directly; if anything, it was the presumed stability of MAD that allowed the US to commit large forces to Vietnam, and the Soviets to intervene as they did, understanding that both sides knew that there were boundaries that would confine the conflict zone and minimize the risks of uncontrolled escalation that both feared (remember, the first major US commitment in Mar 1965 was only 2.5 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis). Neither side was presented with existential danger, in spite of both having the power to threaten it easily; they consciously chose to limit the conflict because the political objectives were insufficiently valuable to risk more than what each was willing to commit.

In the specific context of Ukraine, are you suggesting that Ukraine or any of the parties supporting it should be fighting to destroy Putin's regime? If so, and if those efforts show any signs of being plausibly achieved, it virtually guarantees significant escalation that could easily and rapidly result in the deaths of millions of Americans. How exactly is that better than any other outcome, including the utter defeat of Ukraine?

In reply to 02Pilot :

What we want is for the Russians to "destroy Putin's regime".

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

And what comes after that? If you look at the history of revolutions, both in Russia and more broadly, you'll see that very few end up in situations modern Westerners would consider positive. Without direct involvement, the West will have little influence on that question, and the possibilities for something less stable and more dangerous are far greater than those of a friendly, benign new regime. As bad as Putin's Russia might be, there are much worse, but very plausible, alternatives. I'm reminded of an old Russian response to the simple question "How are you?" - "Not as good as yesterday, but definitely better than tomorrow."

02Pilot said:

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

And what comes after that? If you look at the history of revolutions, both in Russia and more broadly, you'll see that very few end up in situations modern Westerners would consider positive. Without direct involvement, the West will have little influence on that question, and the possibilities for something less stable and more dangerous are far greater than those of a friendly, benign new regime. As bad as Putin's Russia might be, there are much worse, but very plausible, alternatives. I'm reminded of an old Russian response to the simple question "How are you?" - "Not as good as yesterday, but definitely better than tomorrow."

This comes up frequently, and I think that the desire to see the last of Putin is logical.

I admire your patience in pointing out that it could always be worse. 

In reply to Floating Doc (Forum Supporter) :

I seldom post on this page, just suck in the news, but the often quote above is easy to shrug off for us who have been born with so much. It is only scratching the surface of the Russian national psyche though. For those who want to understand more from an inside perspective read "My Russia" by Peter Ustinov. Known as a comic, he was one of us car people, and his comedy and book were born of first hand observation. 

Floating Doc (Forum Supporter) said:

02Pilot said:

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

And what comes after that? If you look at the history of revolutions, both in Russia and more broadly, you'll see that very few end up in situations modern Westerners would consider positive. Without direct involvement, the West will have little influence on that question, and the possibilities for something less stable and more dangerous are far greater than those of a friendly, benign new regime. As bad as Putin's Russia might be, there are much worse, but very plausible, alternatives. I'm reminded of an old Russian response to the simple question "How are you?" - "Not as good as yesterday, but definitely better than tomorrow."

This comes up frequently, and I think that the desire to see the last of Putin is logical.

I admire your patience in pointing out that it could always be worse. 

I don't know, I still think that it was a good thing for the French to get rid of the Monarchy even if it backfired and ushered in Napoleon Bonaparte and who also was eventually ushered out. Same with Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi...

If at first you don't succeed, try, try again...

Looks like a massive drone strike by Ukraine took out hundreds of stored glide bombs at an airfield.  Some pretty big explosions.  Unknown whether it damaged any of the aircraft there.

VolvoHeretic said:

Floating Doc (Forum Supporter) said:

02Pilot said:

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

And what comes after that? If you look at the history of revolutions, both in Russia and more broadly, you'll see that very few end up in situations modern Westerners would consider positive. Without direct involvement, the West will have little influence on that question, and the possibilities for something less stable and more dangerous are far greater than those of a friendly, benign new regime. As bad as Putin's Russia might be, there are much worse, but very plausible, alternatives. I'm reminded of an old Russian response to the simple question "How are you?" - "Not as good as yesterday, but definitely better than tomorrow."

This comes up frequently, and I think that the desire to see the last of Putin is logical.

I admire your patience in pointing out that it could always be worse. 

I don't know, I still think that it was a good thing for the French to get rid of the Monarchy even if it backfired and ushered in Napoleon Bonaparte and who also was eventually ushered out. Same with Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi...

If at first you don't succeed, try, try again...

After Napoleon was shown the door the second time, the French restored the monarchy. If anything, the Napoleonic Wars made European leaders more committed to preserving monarchy (via the Congress of Vienna) and resisting change, not to mention killing some four million people (estimates range from three to six) over two decades of fighting. Two hundred years later this may seem like a positive outcome; I doubt those significantly closer to the experience felt the same.

The major difference between the cases you list and Russia today is the latter's possession of a massive nuclear arsenal, which would seem to alter the calculus somewhat.

I barely check into this thread, too... but ...

WRT Putin and what comes next- arguably, this war is more about Putin not really delivering progress to his country, right?  Commonly, when leaders are failing, they make up things to start a conflict to remain in power.  And I thought it's been brought up more than once that the real root to Putin making this move is the country starting to figure out that they are falling behind their former soviet states.

So what they really need is someone who will restart the country as an adder to the world economy.  Not sending out resources to other countries to make even more money, but producing stuff to bring money into the pockets of nominal people.  As much as we distrust China- this is exactly how their dictators have remained in power.  I do really wonder if China sees that "taking over the world" is a lot easier from an economic perspective than by force- people are more happy when you lead them to a better life than leading them to misery.  Happy people mean easy leadership.  Angry people results in revolutions.

It's not perfect by any measure- the US are not angels in the world.  I would argue that Iraq was a war that we had no real idea what "winning" really meant, which was pretty clear when it came to after the fighting.  Maybe less so for Afghanistan- but even there we didn't really define how to "win".    But when you can be distracted by what kind of stuff you can get and what kind of entertainment you can see because of prosperity....  

Anyway, I'll reiterate that had Putin gave Ukraine a realistic economic option to grow, they would have stayed partnered.  But that hasn't happened to almost all former USSR states.  And many of them turned West to make the population happy with a system to make their and their kids lives better.

Speculate all you want, this is what ISW has to say about Ukraine's invasion of Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2024

Aug 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.

Noddaz said:

Speculate all you want, this is what ISW has to say about Ukraine's invasion of Russia....

Uhmmm.... that would be Special Military Operation sir!   

(I will confirm though, that some of the map sites are not updating info on this, so there is certainly cooperation going on, information wise)

In reply to eastsideTim :

I at first thought you were referring to the attack shown previously (which did at least destroy one plane and damage a few others), but this is a new one.  This is an airfield in Lipetsk, which is directly south of Moscow, so very much would support strikes on the... Special Military Operation.  The Ukrainians seem to be demonstrating their massive increase in the supply of drones.

There are also reports of an ambush of a troop convoy heading to cut off the Ukrainians.  Trucks full of soldiers hit by what is likely HIMARS.  There is the potential for 100's of Russian soldiers dead.  I am suspicious this attack technically falls under the US allowing use of US weapons across the boarder, but only in the Kherson ares (which this kind of is), and one of the reasons why it is so successful

Also of note is that north of where the advance is a large Russian nuclear power plant (west of Kursk).  Although rather unlikely they would go that far, it does create some interesting scenarios.

The Russians are claiming the Ukrainians are already building defenses (?).    So, maybe they want to try and hold it?

The Russian situation is getting interesting.  This SMO is certainly a distraction to the recent arrival of F16's (and might give them some more breathing room to get settled in) and the attacks in Crimea (on the entirely other side of the conflict) and the need to defend the Kerch bridge, and the massive effort in the central part of the front.... and diminishing reserves...  I am certainly not going to predict any Russian collapse (which seems forever unlikely) but this SMO is certainly a big problem for Russia, and HAS to be a big boost for Ukrainian moral, which is desperately needed.

aircooled said:

Noddaz said:

Speculate all you want, this is what ISW has to say about Ukraine's invasion of Russia....

Uhmmm.... that would be Special Military Operation sir!   

 

(I will confirm though, that some of the map sites are not updating info on this, so there is certainly cooperation going on, information wise)

And right you are, because after all that area has historically always been part of Ukraine.

In reply to WOW Really Paul? :

I think you are dramatically oversimplifying the social and political dynamics at play in Vietnam, North and South. Nationalism and religion were enormously important to how things played out, for example (the Catholic exodus from the North in 1954-5 and the Buddhist Crisis in the South in 1963 were massively significant at the time). While much of the population was apolitical in the narrow sense, they certainly had preferences for particular governmental priorities. That the US and the Soviet Union became involved was no different than what happened in countless post-colonial countries in the Cold War context.