History in the Making: Russian Invasion

In reply to CrustyRedXpress :

Per the link you posted, the quote given from Putin is “This will mean that NATO countries – the United States and European countries – are at war with Russia. And if this is the case, then, bearing in mind the change in the essence of the conflict, we will make appropriate decisions in response to the threats that will be posed to us.”

There are a number of points here. First, it's a translation. My Russian is almost non-existent, but I'd like to see what words he actually used, and then determine if there is any nuance in that. Beyond that, look at the carefully-chosen language. He never says Russia is at war, but that NATO is - it's a passive construction, designed to reinforce the narrative of Russia as victim to a domestic audience. Nor does he make any sort of direct statement about a response, just that the "appropriate decisions" will be taken in response to specific threats. It's pretty clear that he is trying to maintain a lot of ambiguity, likely because 1) his options are limited, 2) he doesn't want to take undue risks, and 3) he can't afford to be seen domestically as backing down.

So what happens if US/UK approval for ATACMS and Storm Shadow to be used inside Russia? It all depends on how they are used. Right now, the whole debate is centered on two Russian capabilities: recently-delivered Iranian ballistic missiles, and glide bombs. I have no doubt that if approval is given (it was not granted after the most recent talks), it will be for use against the former, and possibly the latter, but that's it. I'm sure there's concern about the optics - US-marked missile parts littering the Russian landscape and showing up on Russian television - and also about reinforcing Putin's narrative. As for Putin's response, it will be measured and asymmetric.

On the last point, to clarify something I mentioned earlier, if Russia were to attempt a repeat of Cuba in 1962 and place nuclear weapons outside the country, note that when this was done it Cuba, the Soviets retained full control over all nuclear weapons and release authority; any such movement now would surely involve the same restrictions. The real question is whether there is any country willing to host such a force in the current security environment; Venezuela might, if Putin guarantees that Maduro stays in power, as might one or two African nations, though access could be a problem. I consider it a low probability event, but not out of the question.

I think that Russian nukes on foreign soil line has already been crossed: Yahoo.com: UPDATE 2-Belarus starts taking delivery of Russian nuclear weapons - president

Give some to Ukraine.

In reply to VolvoHeretic :

Deploying to Belarus doesn't change anything (if anything, this was done to create a plausible excuse for Russia putting troops in if Lukashenko is toppled or goes wobbly: "We must secure our nuclear weapons!"). Deploying to Venezuela, Cuba, west Africa, whatever, very much would.

No changes in policy yet:

According to the results of the negotiations between Biden and the Prime Minister of Britain, the USA is not ready to lift restrictions on strikes on the Russian Federation, — spokesman Miller

This is a base they launch the large TU-95 bombers from:

Explosions are heard in the area of ​​the Engels airfield in the Saratov region. A fire is visible, - Russian media

You can see here the result of the Russian counter-offensive in the Kiev area. You can also see the new Ukrainian offensive which puts them to the rear of the Russian offensive (the current Ukrainian advances are likely farther than shown here).  First image is a few days ago:

Also, the Ukrainians are guessing 2025 is a critical year for the Russians:

Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.[1] Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment.[2] Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts.[3] Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel.[4] Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility.[5] Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine.[6] Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative.[7] It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026.

On the subject of kontraktniki, this video is interesting.

A good article from this weekend's WSJ offering a broader perspective than most: Ignore the Defeatists: America's Strategy is Working in Ukraine

One of the important things outlined in the article above, is the three part strategy (not sure if this is an actual articulated strategy, but it does make sense).   Is this an answer to the common question of "what is the off ramp here"?  I am not sure:

...The strategy has three pillars. The first is to furnish Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and help with targeting. This has been an enormous initiative, comparable to the Lend-Lease program for U.S. allies in World War II and encompassing the contributions not just of the U.S., France, Britain and Germany but of dozens of other countries, from Canada to South Korea....

...The second pillar has been to tighten ties to Ukraine. NATO membership may be elusive, but several countries are moving toward long-term, formalized military partnerships, precisely what the U.S. and the countries of Europe refused to do between 2014 and 2022...

...Finally, Ukraine is entering Europe. The depredations of the conflict will make it an arduous journey. Wars do not render countries more democratic, more enlightened or more demographically secure, and Russia is doing everything it can to undermine Ukraine’s societal foundations....

In reply to aircooled :

Off-ramp for whom? The Western goal is simply to contain Russia, in this case by raising the costs of continuing the war until its government determines that it is no longer worth the expenditure. Escalating the war could speed the process, but could also create circumstances whereby Russia feels compelled to act in ways that undermine the existing, relatively peaceful and prosperous, situation that prevails in Western countries.

Russia is already compelled to act against the western world.

Their bot farms are seeding propaganda on social networks & instilling distrust, low grade black ops are damaging infrastructure which leads to fearfulness, etc.  The West can't win this kind of cold war because Russia has already lost it internally and now wants to infect the rest of the world.

And the off ramp for Putin remains the same:

Declare that Ukrainian de-nazification has been achieved. Russian troops will be brought home to victory celebrations. Survivors will be reintegrated into the decimated workforce to get the economy going again. Ukraine will give back Kursk and Russia gives back some territory, but (sadly) not all of it.

Putin always has an off ramp because he controls the information space in Russia and controls the military that can be used to put down dissent.

02Pilot said:

In reply to aircooled :

Off-ramp for whom? The Western goal is simply to contain Russia, in this case by raising the costs of continuing the war until its government determines that it is no longer worth the expenditure. Escalating the war could speed the process, but could also create circumstances whereby Russia feels compelled to act in ways that undermine the existing, relatively peaceful and prosperous, situation that prevails in Western countries.

Something about this reminds me of the situation in the Philippines early WWII when the Japanese were surprised at how long the US had fought and in how bad a condition they were when they surrendered.  I have to wonder if anyone in Russia is asking the question of at what point the expenditures on Ukraine start to seriously weaken Russia's ability to repel the same sort of invasion in reverse, or more importantly, their ability to quell insurrection.

02Pilot said:

In reply to aircooled :

Off-ramp for whom? The Western goal is simply to contain Russia...

I am not entirely sure that has been clearly stated (by the US at least) though as a primary goal.  Or maybe it's just not recognized as one? (I am kind of just going off of what I hear as a common complaint).  One of the big criticisms of the US involvement is there is no defined end goal.  Of course "containment" is a bit of an amorphous goal and kind of implies it never ends, so that may be why it is not a common point (e.g. basically declaring a forever "war"), because that likely does not play well in the populous (especially after just getting out of a few, seemingly, forever wars).

FJ40Jim said:

And the off ramp for Putin remains the same:

Declare that Ukrainian de-nazification has been achieved. Russian troops will be brought home to victory celebrations. Survivors will be reintegrated into the decimated workforce to get the economy going again. Ukraine will give back Kursk and Russia gives back some territory, but (sadly) not all of it.

Putin always has an off ramp because he controls the information space in Russia and controls the military that can be used to put down dissent.

QFT! The idea that somehow Russia's back is against the wall is bizarre to me. Putin (or his successor) can call the troops back at any time and take the L. At some point I think the balance will tip and it will be in their interest to do so...just as it was in Afghanistan.

CrustyRedXpress said:

The idea that somehow Russia's back is against the wall is bizarre to me. Putin (or his successor) can call the troops back at any time and take the L. At some point I think the balance will tip and it will be in their interest to do so...just as it was in Afghanistan.

What exactly happens next if Putin declares defeat and calls the troops home? How long does he survive? Who succeeds him? Do they countermand the order, or worse? What happens next? Russia is infinitely more volatile now than was the Soviet Union in 1987.

Putin can declare victory at any time. Then the troops can come home because P says Ukraine is de-nazi-ed (which is true). And he can say that Ukraine is crippled (temporarily true) and will never invade Russia (true, nobody wants to invade Russia). Russia is a winner because P says so, anyone who disagrees is introduced to a 10th floor window.

FJ40Jim said:

Putin can declare victory at any time. Then the troops can come home because P says Ukraine is de-nazi-ed (which is true). And he can say that Ukraine is crippled (temporarily true) and will never invade Russia (true, nobody wants to invade Russia). Russia is a winner because P says so, anyone who disagrees is introduced to a 10th floor window.

Two points suggest this is not as easy as indicated. One, you're ignoring the very real power dynamics in the Russian hierarchy. Putin is not without vulnerability; he is surrounded by people with actual power, some of whom are vastly more hawkish than he is, and in the wrong circumstances, it could be Putin taking the one-way outdoor elevator ride. Two, ending the fighting in Ukraine removes it as a focal point supporting Putin's narrative of Russian victimhood, which is enormously important as an explanation for the failures of his administration to his domestic audience; without their at least tacit support, his continuation in power is impossible.

Don't forget, Gorbachev may have withdrawn from Afghanistan and attempted to keep the Soviet Union intact by introducing needed reforms (unsurprisingly lauded by the West), but he failed to do so, and as it imploded, he was nearly the victim of a hardline coup in August 1991. Putin does not intend to allow such a situation to arise.

This appears to have happened within the past 12 hours or so.

NASA FIRMS for the area says it is still on fire.

https://www.reddit.com/r/interestingasberkeley/s/crmjHUKjDy

Edit:

Damnit.  We need to be able to turn the Berkeley filter off at some point.

In reply to Mr_Asa :

"Russian Ministry of Defense reports successful interception of a Ukrainian drone using innovative new automatic reaction munitions response. Officials are proud to report the drone was successfully destroyed by the munitions...."

I think this thread is above using reddit as a source

maschinenbau said:

I think this thread is above using reddit as a source

I get where you're coming from, but I think Mr. Asa is just referring to Reddit as a place to post links/video. 

Here are links to non-social media sites that describe the same event: 

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/09/18/ukraine-attack-russia-missile-depot-mini-earthquake/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/18/ukraine-drone-attack-on-russian-arms-depot-toropets

==============================

No clue if this is impactful to the greater conflict, or just a big boom.

02Pilot said:

Two points suggest this is not as easy as indicated. One, you're ignoring the very real power dynamics in the Russian hierarchy. Putin is not without vulnerability; he is surrounded by people with actual power, some of whom are vastly more hawkish than he is [snip]

Who is close to Putin, is more hawkish than he is, and also has the power to dispose him?

CrustyRedXpress said:

02Pilot said:

Two points suggest this is not as easy as indicated. One, you're ignoring the very real power dynamics in the Russian hierarchy. Putin is not without vulnerability; he is surrounded by people with actual power, some of whom are vastly more hawkish than he is [snip]

Who is close to Putin, is more hawkish than he is, and also has the power to dispose him?

The three names I'd immediately consider are Naryshkin, Bortnikov, and Patrushev. They're all old Putin colleagues from Leningrad, but that doesn't mean they wouldn't stab him - individually or collectively - if provoked.

02Pilot said:

CrustyRedXpress said:

02Pilot said:

Two points suggest this is not as easy as indicated. One, you're ignoring the very real power dynamics in the Russian hierarchy. Putin is not without vulnerability; he is surrounded by people with actual power, some of whom are vastly more hawkish than he is [snip]

Who is close to Putin, is more hawkish than he is, and also has the power to dispose him?

The three names I'd immediately consider are Naryshkin, Bortnikov, and Patrushev. They're all old Putin colleagues from Leningrad, but that doesn't mean they wouldn't stab him - individually or collectively - if provoked.

So if all three of them simultaneously fall out a window, it's a sign Putin is ready to negotiate.

maschinenbau said:

I think this thread is above using reddit as a source

I just wanted to show the big holy-goddamn explosion that triggered seismometers in Estonia to record a 2.8 on the richter scale.

And in a world where twitter is no longer the place to find breaking news, you have to go somewhere. 

But I personally pulled up the NASA FIRMS page and saw that the region is indeed home to Trogdor the Burninator

You have to kind of get info where you can.  Ukraine is very good at keeping things under wraps.  Russia used to be an absolute fire hose of leaked info, but that has slowed down greatly.  I get a lot of my info from Telegram, which is an even less regulated version of Twitter(!!), if you can believe that. (but it has proven to be reasonably reliable)

Preliminary, the warehouses stored up to 30 thousand tons of various BC (Iskanders, Tochka-US, KABs, Grads, 82mm mines, etc). 

This is in the northern area, so will likely affect Russia fighting capabilities in the Kursk area.