I can't help but notice that our political class has the attention span of a gnat.
I can't help but notice that our political class has the attention span of a gnat.
VolvoHeretic said:I can't help but notice that our political class has the attention span of a gnat.
If that's so, it's only because they represent the rest of the population.
As for Russian fossil fuels- Recall back at the start of all of this that Ural crude was trading at a significant discount to Brent crude- something like $25/barrel cheaper. Today, it's trading only a few dollars a barrel cheaper. Oil in general is cheaper now than in 2022 (I can recall driving back from our family vacation in February of that year and fuel prices increasing dramatically along the way), but still, the gap between the two is pretty small. Russia is clearly finding a buyer for all it can produce.
Mr_Asa said:NOHOME said:Never heard of the other dude.
Grant? You've never heard of Ulysses S Grant? Commander of the Union Army against Lee and the Confederates? Eventual president of the United States?
He's Canadian.
Stampie said:Mr_Asa said:NOHOME said:Never heard of the other dude.
Grant? You've never heard of Ulysses S Grant? Commander of the Union Army against Lee and the Confederates? Eventual president of the United States?
He's Canadian.
Pretty sure Ulysses S. Grant wasn't Canadian.
In reply to Stampie :
Ok, fair.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Yeah, I'm not even a good armchair military strategist so my views are going to be oversimplified at best. Your mention of potential waning domestic support is a good reminder of that. At the same time though, I think if "the moral is to the physical as three is to one" then russia has been operating at a bigger deficit than I thought (and for quite some time now).
If I look at my position I think I suffer the same faults as you say Ukraine does. I do not consider the strategic or economic points of view as in my mind I see this from an "invader vs invaded" standpoint where the invader needs to completely conquer, while the invaded needs to hold out. From that perspective the war looks unwinnable to me for russia. So when I see the US saying they are "looking for something more" before releasing aid that could potentially end this sooner, I tend to see it more as "apathetic" on their part.
The few times I DID let my mind venture off into the economic warfare side of the house I generally ended up in a North Korea scenario, and I think we've already decided that that's not likely to happen.
And so it goes...
In reply to Hungary Bill (Forum Supporter) :
Putting machine guns behind your own troops, maintaining an active secret police, and prosecuting for even minor acts of dissent tends to keep up morale, right up until it doesn't.
The reason the strategic and economic perspectives matter is that, no matter what the resolution, for it to be acceptable to the West, it has to be sustainable without Ukraine turning into a dependent client of the US or EU. That huge amounts of money have already been expended is only a minor miracle, but given the circumstances, one that managed to maintain a fair degree of support. But once the fighting stops, dumping billions into Ukraine is going to become a political liability, and fast. Ukraine will have to be able to stand on its own; this is why I suggest that the settlement must include for the provision of large quantities of defensive military equipment, because getting support for it later will be nigh unto impossible. First and foremost, conditions have to be established for a Ukraine that is defensible and economically self-sustaining - territorial integrity is secondary, and has been since the Industrial Revolution disconnected the causal linkage between land, wealth, and power. Again, think about South Korea: would they have liked to hold the whole peninsula? Of course, but they don't, and after 1951's stalemate, it took two years, a change in US administration, and the death of Stalin to finally make an imperfect settlement even possible, but it's held (more or less) for 71 years, and look at South Korea today. They didn't get where they are because of the amount of land they hold or where the borders are.
The Russian have finally taken Vuhledar (south east front), after many, many tries (lower right of map, just as the front turns). It seems like it might be a bit of a Pyrrhic victory (as much of this thing as been):
The Russian seizure of Vuhledar follows a series of costly, failed Russian assaults near the settlement over the past two and a half years. A prominent Russian milblogger celebrated reports of Vuhledar’s seizure by recalling an alleged conversation he had with a Russian high-ranking officer, who told him that the Russian decision to attack in the Vuhledar direction in March 2022 was ill-advised because Russian forces would get “stuck” on the settlement.[6] The milblogger implied that the officer was wrong given that Russian forces eventually seized Vuhledar, although the milblogger failed to acknowledge that Russian forces struggled to advance in the Vuhledar area for over two years. Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in October-November 2022 and January-February 2023, both of which resulted in heavy personnel and military equipment losses.[7] Russia's previous defeats around Vuhledar notably resulted in the attrition of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD).[8]
As can also bee seen on the map, the advance towards the crossroads at Pokrovsk continues... slowly, and almost certainly at great cost.
The Russians have also been doing lots of work adding defenses to the Kerch bridge. E.g. putting Pantsir SAM system (which are truck based) on tall structures (kind of like scaffolding) near the bridge and adding lots of floating barriers. Clearly they are still very concerned.
A Russian TU-95 was doing the typical, lets see how close we can get to the US in Alaska recently. The US intercepted (F-16?) and the Eszcort plane did this. This is VERY close and looks similar to what they were doing with US drones, trying to destabilize them.
A map to show all the Russian gains (red) and Ukrainian gains (blue) as the result of the years fighting. Not super impressive. As noted previously. The Ukrainians primary issues, equipment wise, are the Russian gliding bombs and artillery. Both or which are essentially impossible to see or hear coming or to counter acts. The Russians just throw enough out, eventually they will hit/kill something. They have also been dropping gliding bombs into the city of Zaporishia recently for some reason.
In (other) news. Expect the Israelis to punch back at Iran (after getting actual missile hits in cities in the recent attack). They recently took out a couple of ports in Yemen in response to an attack from there. After the last missile attack they reportedly dropped a missile right next to a nuclear test site in Iran, that Iran never saw coming....
Also an interesting story/rumor: Apparently the Iranians setup a special unit to detect Israeli spies in Iran (which Israel is very good at). The head of that unit....
...an Israeli operative.
In reply to aircooled :
I was reading that they dropped the air-launched ballistic missle right on top of an S300 site in Iran with minimal collateral damage. If true, that's pretty damn impressive!
I've been watching History of Everything on YouTube
Today he premiered this and I felt compelled to share it here.
02Pilot has mentioned the dangers of assuming that putin and/or the russians use the same logic we in the west use. Some more discussion on that and how it leads to some incorrect predictions:
Putin has apparently leveled his mansion in Sochi. It is likely he is preemptively getting rid of it because of the regular appearance of Ukrainian drones in the area!
The Dutch F-16's are starting to arrive in Ukraine.
A Ukrainian missile strike has apparently killed six North Korean officers!
Ukraine continues to hit airfield and oil storage facilities.
The Russians may be trying, yet another, offensive in the Zaporizhzhia in an attempt to capture the Zaporizhzhia cross roads. This seem like a very long shot considering their progress in other areas! It does explain the concentration of glide bombs to that area though. Apparently they are trying to cut that supply route. Note on map below where the lake used to be (dry since dam was destroyed). That land is likely still very soft though with no cover, so don't expect much fighting there.
ISW has some interesting comments on the state of the Russian offensives. There was a guess that the Ukrainians Kiev offensive is a last desperate attempt using the last of their reserves(?), while this may be an indication of the same thing on the Russian side (with less significant advances of course).
Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023.[1] The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles (roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024. Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive efforts.[2] The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.
The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries.[3] Russian forces appear to have limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[4] Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for marginal territorial advances.[5] The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction.[6] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline.[7] Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.
In "other" news: Remember that Hezbollah leader they blew up? Well, they replaced him.... they blew him up, and they replaced that guy... and they just blew that one up....
Hezbollah leaders:
💀 Hassan Nasrallah: Eliminated on September 27.
💀 Hassan Khalil Yassin: Appointed on September 28. Eliminated hours later.
💀 Hashem Safieddine: Appointed on October 1. Eliminated on October 3.
As an update to the recent Iranian attack. Despite what the Israelis might claim, there were numerous deaths. They managed to drop a booster on a Palestinian (I saw the video, it almost seems fake, but I guess it isn't, quite literally a large booster flattening a guy in a parking lot like area!) AND they killed 5 Iranians when one of the rockets blew up on launch!
Also, the anticipated Israeli response has not happened. This will certainly make the news, and today might be an expected "make a point" day, but maybe too obvious. The Iranians are literally warning the Israelis not to attack Kharg island, which is where almost all the Iranian oil (98% as of 2012) goes through, and of course, oil is most of their economy! It's a HUGE bare neck for Iran! Pretty ballsy to blatantly attack a country that can pretty easily take out most of your economy in a matter of minutes!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kharg_Island
I wouldn't be surprised if the Israelis used the Oct 24, 2024 as their "make a point" day. That would the same date (but 1 year later) on the Hebrew calendar as October 7, 2023.
In reply to DarkMonohue :
I watched the whole video, but I haven't had time to look at the CSIS report mentioned. Eliot Cohen is usually pretty good, so it's probably worth reading.
I think some of the points made here are valid, but the presentation is both somewhat circular and rather self-congratulatory (though mostly indirectly). Nielsen is a prodigious content producer on his (subscription-driven) website, but looking at his background (Danish naval officer, but his assignments have been to noncombat vessels as far as I can tell) and publications (a few book chapters on naval and air defense topics), I'm not entirely certain what underpins his approach to international relations, other than his military education. Aside from self-promotion, which is certainly an acceptable objective in this media environment, there's a hint of the old Henry Kissinger maxim that "In academia, the fights are so vicious because the stakes are so low." I don't know if he's got a particular axe to grind with Mearsheimer, but I got the sense that he might.
As far as his analysis goes, I think he misses on two counts. One, his criticism of the realist approach ignores the point Mearsheimer was making the clip he shows. Mearsheimer suggested that Russia wasn't likely to invade because it didn't need to, as it was already setting up conditions to achieve its objectives without fighting; that it did invade doesn't change the basis of the analysis. From a military perspective, this is a wrong prediction, but from an IR professional perspective, it's a correct analysis of the situation. Two, Nielsen himself ignores something I've been talking about here for a while: the domestic factor in Russian decision-making, which assuredly is something in Putin's mind now, as it would have been before the decision to invade was made. Redirecting popular dissatisfaction against an external rival is a time-honored practice among unpopular leaders.
Some historians study counterfactual history, examining the possible results of minor changes in the course of events. For a moment, just consider a possibility that was all but unanimously held when the invasion began. Let's say the initial Russian operation to seize Hostomel airfield and rapidly capture Kyiv with airborne and special forces troops was successful. Even if resistance everywhere else in Ukraine produced the historical results initially, with the government decapitated (either dead, captured, or in exile), Western aid would have been far more difficult to secure and coordinate. This would likely have allowed Russia to achieve further success, while undermining Ukrainian morale and cohesion. In this scenario, it is very possible that Russia would have achieved its objectives within six months, and installed a puppet government in Kyiv. Even if fierce resistance continued, Russia would be able to declare victory. Their losses to date would be far fewer than have actually occurred, Putin would be viewed at home as successfully defending Russia from Western encroachment, and popular support for him would be considerably higher. The West would likely have made similar decisions regarding bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO, as well as applying sanctions, and would remain more strongly opposed to Russia than before the invasion, but it is unlikely that Russia would have remained an international pariah two years on. Because no Western nation is willing to go to war for Ukraine, in this counterfactual the de facto reality of a Russian-controlled Ukraine would have been largely accepted, and Western governments would be looking at how to prevent further Russian adventures, not how to liberate Ukraine.
That one small change - one that was widely expected to occur - would have radically changed how we talk about the predictive analysis. Should we learn from events? Of course we should. Can IR models be improved? Sure. But it's a bit much to dismiss an entire school of thought with a rich literature and widespread influence based on one prediction.
In a fairly bizarre twist, Russia shot down one of its own drones over Ukraine. Not just any drone, but an S-70 Hunter-B, which is an advanced stealth unit designed to operate as a loyal wingman to the Su-57 Felon; the accompanying Felon is what downed it. Not only that, but it was armed with a payload of glide bombs when it went down. Lots of speculation, but the most plausible explanation seems to be that this was an operational trial, and that control of the S-70 was lost. Rather than risk it being captured intact, they shot it down, but there's still a lot left from the photos I've seen. It's been hauled away for analysis.
A zoomed in frame of the video
What the S-70 looks like
Some info on the shoot down from wikipedia. This makes you wonder a bit if the US (west) saw this thing coming and setup some sort of electronic warfare attack on it to get a look at it:
On 5 October 2024, an S-70 was shot down by an air-to-air missile from a Russian Su-57, near Kostiantynivka, in Ukraine. Together the S-70 and the Su-57 had taken off from Akhtubinsk Air Base 365 miles (587 km) from the front lines for an operational test flight. The drone apparently lost contact with its ground control. By the time attempts to regain control had been abandoned, the drone had crossed the front lines into Ukrainian and the Su-57 deliberately shot it down. The Armed Forces of Ukraine consequently gained access to the drone's wreckage for analysis. Among the wreckage, components of a UMPB D-30SN glide bomb were found.
Another interesting thing. That seems like a lot of drone!
Ukraine is now capable of manufacturing up to four million drones annually. Despite that number, it may not be enough—Lithuania is donating 5,000 FPV drones to Ukraine.
aircooled said:Another interesting thing. That seems like a lot of drone!
Ukraine is now capable of manufacturing up to four million drones annually. Despite that number, it may not be enough—Lithuania is donating 5,000 FPV drones to Ukraine.
This is beginning to sound like the carousel has spun 360 and we're now back to "who can get there firstest with the mostest". I'd love to see a DARPA study on how many 3D printers in the US could be used to make X number of drones in Y amount of time, if the circumstances called for it.
02Pilot said:
...The West would likely have made similar decisions regarding bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO, as well as applying sanctions, and would remain more strongly opposed to Russia than before the invasion, but it is unlikely that Russia would have remained an international pariah two years on. Because no Western nation is willing to go to war for Ukraine, in this counterfactual the de facto reality of a Russian-controlled Ukraine would have been largely accepted, and Western governments would be looking at how to prevent further Russian adventures, not how to liberate Ukraine.That one small change - one that was widely expected to occur - would have radically changed how we talk about the predictive analysis. Should we learn from events? Of course we should. Can IR models be improved? Sure. But it's a bit much to dismiss an entire school of thought with a rich literature and widespread influence based on one prediction.
Just to expand on this. If this had happened, any opinions on what would end up happening to Moldova? I'd think Russia wouldn't be able to resist grabbing it, and Romania would not be happy about that.
In reply to eastsideTim :
If Russia controlled Ukraine, it would have no need to do anything so drastic. I wouldn't be surprised if they put some support into formalizing Transnistria and hardening the border between it and the rest of Moldova, but Moldova itself doesn't pose any real concern in the way that Ukraine does.
aircooled said:Another interesting thing. That seems like a lot of drone!
Ukraine is now capable of manufacturing up to four million drones annually. Despite that number, it may not be enough—Lithuania is donating 5,000 FPV drones to Ukraine.
This is fodder for another thread, but it sure seems like this war is something of a tipping point in terms of technology and tactics. It also makes me think of some videos that I've seen of recent military recruits - most of them looked well less than the stereotypical macho soldier. They were relatively soft, multi-racial and multi-sexual. They looked like people who might do a fine job with logistics and tech, but who would be in real trouble in an old fashioned firefight.
In reply to Kreb (Forum Supporter) :
It is probably best in another thread, but training and morale are everything. Look at Israel's military for a prime example of this.
Lots of experience with video games etc. isn't exactly a bad thing at this point for someone going into the military now!
You'll need to log in to post.
