History in the Making: Russian Invasion

Kreb (Forum Supporter) said:

It would be nice if some of those Israeli munitions found their way to Iranian drone factories.

That was my thought, I wonder how a crippled Iran affects the flow of supplies to Russia. 

Pretty interesting on-the-ground perspective from the other side. How the guy managed to get press credentials, I'll never know.

In reply to volvoclearinghouse :

I don't really buy us being the primary cause. It's kind like the people who commit crimes and say that society made them that way. No dude, you are still responsible for your own actions, and last time I checked, Biden hasn't attacked Ukraine. That said, our tendency to stick our noses into so many areas of contention practically begs for blame to be sent our way.

In reply to volvoclearinghouse :

Just out of curiosity, how is Ukraine aid affecting disaster recovery?  FEMA is funded entirely separately from the military aid and is not affected by the donation of aging munitions and weapon systems.  Monitary aid for Ukraine comes from special budgetary packages and is not drawing money from already established budgetary items.  

In reply to volvoclearinghouse :

Just out of curiosity, how is Ukraine aid affecting disaster recovery?  FEMA is funded entirely separately from the military aid and is not affected by the donation of aging munitions and weapon systems.  Monitary aid for Ukraine comes from special budgetary packages and is not drawing money from already established budgetary items.  

In reply to volvoclearinghouse :

That sounds like an international poll, not a United States poll. So few of the US citizenry even realizes there is still a conflict in Ukraine anymore. Past their attention span.

volvoclearinghouse said:

 

I saw a poll recently (sorry, I don't have the source) where something north of 70% of those polled said the United States was the primary cause of the war.  The other 30% were split between mostly Russia, and a little Ukraine.  

A claim like this really does warrant a source.

In reply to volvoclearinghouse :

Personally, I downvoted it because its a statement that doesn't stand on its own at all, nor does it contribute positively to the discussion.  Russia invaded Crimea.  Then Russia invaded Ukraine.  Unless the un-named source is somehow say that the US winning the Cold War and causing the USSR to disband caused Russia to want to reunify the USSR, there's literally no way that 70% of any national population is blaming the US.

Even Russia would follow Russian propaganda and say that they went into de-nazify Ukraine, or whatever other propaganda based reason was being advanced at the time.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary sources

volvoclearinghouse said:

Why bother, when it immediately gets down voted to the point of being hidden?  I wasn't making the claim, I was sharing information, which is what I thought this forum was for.  Next time I'll only share approved information. 

Man, you went from zero to defensive awfully quickly. What's wrong with asking for a source?

I think the argument is, if the US hadn't given military aid (largely training) to Ukraine after Crimea, then Russia would have just steamrolled Kiev and there'd be no war. 

I don't think the US rates very high on the list of countries sending aid to Ukraine.  We're largely sending old junk that had been moldering in useless stockpiles, not the kind of aid other countries are sending.

The basic argument for US culpability here is not about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but rather the expansion of NATO that followed. The Russians feel as though the West in general, and the US in particular, encouraged Russia to break with its Communist past, then did little to nothing to assist them during the transition, creating mass privation through the "Starving 90s". On top of that, the US then quickly moved to expand NATO westward, toward Russia's borders, which was seen as an aggressive move, NATO being a military alliance directed at the Soviet Union, after all. The Russians argue that it was this series of decisions that left them with no choice but to work to reinforce their border regions, and expand the buffer between themselves and NATO where possible. Ukraine being the last possible such buffer state on the key southern flank, as well as one with close ties to Russia generally, the idea of it joining the West was considered totally unacceptable.

Some reject this argument, but understanding the Russian point of view is necessary in order to make sense of their decision-making process.

In reply to 02Pilot :

"The Russians may not be rational by our standards, but they are rational by their own."

02Pilot said:

The basic argument for US culpability here is not about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but rather the expansion of NATO that followed. The Russians feel as though the West in general, and the US in particular, encouraged Russia to break with its Communist past, then did little to nothing to assist them during the transition, creating mass privation through the "Starving 90s". On top of that, the US then quickly moved to expand NATO westward, toward Russia's borders, which was seen as an aggressive move, NATO being a military alliance directed at the Soviet Union, after all. The Russians argue that it was this series of decisions that left them with no choice but to work to reinforce their border regions, and expand the buffer between themselves and NATO where possible. Ukraine being the last possible such buffer state on the key southern flank, as well as one with close ties to Russia generally, the idea of it joining the West was considered totally unacceptable.

Some reject this argument, but understanding the Russian point of view is necessary in order to make sense of their decision-making process.

So its the US/West's fault for something that happened 30-40 years ago?

Back to propaganda reasoning, at that point.

In reply to Pete. (l33t FS) :

Conversely, I suspect the Russians might agree broadly that "The Americans may not be rational by our standards, but they are rational by their own."

02Pilot said:

The basic argument for US culpability here is not about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but rather the expansion of NATO that followed. The Russians feel as though the West in general, and the US in particular, encouraged Russia to break with its Communist past, then did little to nothing to assist them during the transition, creating mass privation through the "Starving 90s". On top of that, the US then quickly moved to expand NATO westward, toward Russia's borders, which was seen as an aggressive move, NATO being a military alliance directed at the Soviet Union, after all. The Russians argue that it was this series of decisions that left them with no choice but to work to reinforce their border regions, and expand the buffer between themselves and NATO where possible. Ukraine being the last possible such buffer state on the key southern flank, as well as one with close ties to Russia generally, the idea of it joining the West was considered totally unacceptable.

Some reject this argument, but understanding the Russian point of view is necessary in order to make sense of their decision-making process.

One problem with that argument is IF the US stuck their nose into the privatization of Russia, it would have been politically far, far worse.  So the US had to let it just happen as it did, which ended up being powerful Soviet leaders getting control of pretty much everything (illustrating that the USSR wasn't at all Communist).  And then the corruption that was already there in the USSR era just kept going- amplified by the "free market."  It seems that the neighbors didn't follow that path, and got a chance to choose the west vs. east in terms of economic alliance.  Given the opportunity, the choice was pretty darned obvious- which then expanded NATO as those former Warsaw Block countries got nervous that their former director was now out of the picture.

I still contend that if Russia wanted to hold onto control to as much of the Warsaw Pact as possible, they had to set up a better alternative to the West- or at least better than what they did.

Money is what drove the Pact to the west, and money is what made them become members of NATO.

IMHO, what you post is the Russian populous point of view, I'm pretty sure that the actual leaders know the score.  They use the populous view to hide their failings and attack Georgia, Crimea, and now Ukraine.  And hoped that it would be over so fast that they would not be exposed.  Now that N Korean troops are being used, it's getting tough in Russia right now to justify the continuing invasion.

FWIW, I had a good friend (a housemate in my home, and we were each others groomsmen) who worked in post Soviet Russia on some Physics work.  I brought up the idea of doing business there since they were now "open" and he cleared me of that concept really, really quickly.  The transition to free market was not good in his eyes.

In reply to Mr_Asa :

Americans have very short memories by the standards of much of the rest of the world. To the Russians, and many others, 30-40 years is the blink of an eye. I'll give you one example to illustrate my point. On 28 June 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, leader of Serbia, stood before a crowd of two million people and invoked the memory of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, which took place on that date 600 years earlier and saw the Serbs defeated by the Ottoman Turks. He then stated unequivocally that "The next battle, we will not lose!", to the rousing cheers of the crowd. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began the next year, and with it the Serbian campaign against the Muslim population of Bosnia, the heirs to centuries of Ottoman occupation of that territory.

In reply to alfadriver :

I agree that there is a degree of populism involved, but there are also plenty of true believers in the Kremlin. And while the idea of the US government getting involved with the privatization process in Russia would have been doomed to failure, it's not like US companies stayed on the sidelines:

A lot of expectations were built up, both by Yeltsin and the West, that the end of the Soviet era would bring about prosperity. Given what the Soviet people knew of the West, these gained virtually instant traction, giving way to irrational exuberance about the future. The fall from that to the harsh reality of oligarchs and corruption was abrupt and painful.

But for the army, the professional politicians, and the intelligence community, the West's gloating about "winning the Cold War" and rapid expansion of NATO laid the groundwork for a longstanding distrust and, when circumstances allowed, a revanchist revival of a Soviet-tinged Russian Empire.

02Pilot said:

Pretty interesting on-the-ground perspective from the other side. How the guy managed to get press credentials, I'll never know.

Yeah, that is pretty interesting.  Particularly the part where the girl talked about the Donbas region being very multi-cultural (more than just Russian / Ukrainian).  I guess enough Russian to justify Russian intervention though. I hear Russian really put their fingers on that scale though (e.g. making if very easy to get a Russian passports etc).

The Russian talking about defending his family, while marching into another country, seems a bit strange.  But I guess, get them, before they get us? (from their perspective)

Really shows the crossover with some of those people though.  Kind of reminds me of some of the US civil war stories of members of the same family fighting on opposite sides, or of course the West Point graduates fighting their classmates.

..Nine hundred and seventy-seven West Point graduates from the classes of 1833 through 1861 were alive when the Civil War began. Of these men, 259 (26%) joined the Confederacy and 638 (65%) fought for the Union. Eight did not fight for either side. Thirty-nine graduates from these classes who had come to West Point from Southern states fought for the Union and 32 who had come from Northern states fought for the Confederacy...

https://www.clevelandcivilwarroundtable.com/west-point-in-the-civil-war/

I don't want to turn this into the "war and death" thread, but I thought this provides a bit of perspective on the world, war, history, "marketing" of conflicts, and the base cruelness of human kind.

Has anyone here even heard ANY mention of the war in Sedan on any news?

Sudan: Hundreds of Women Died by Suicide to Avoid Rape

The conflict in Sudan has greatly affected women and children, increasing the dangers of sexual violence and forcing many women and children to flee. There have been disturbing reports about women dying by suicide just to avoid being raped by armed militia....

...According to the International Organisation for Migration, over 14 million people fled their homes with hunger, disease and sexual violence rampant.

https://newscentral.africa/sudan-hundreds-of-women-died-by-suicide-to-avoid-rape-hala-kirbi/amp/

For a bit of perspective of what and why and more horror:

• Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the armed forces and in effect the country's president
• And his deputy and leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as "Hemedti".

...The suspicions were that both generals wanted to hang on to their positions of power, unwilling to lose wealth and influence....

For want of power and money... this is the result:

....The UN says the war has triggered the "world's worst hunger crisis". According to non-profit organisation Action Against Hunger, five million Sudanese people are dealing with "emergency levels of hunger"....

..In October, the BBC saw fresh evidence of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, most of which has been blamed on militias that are part of - or affiliated with - the RSF.

This year a report from campaign group Human Rights Watch said ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity had been committed against ethnic Massalit and non-Arab communities in the region by the paramilitary forces and its Arab allies.

The UK, UN, US and a number of other entities have said civilians in the state are being targeted because of their identity....

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59035053

In reply to aircooled :

Peter Zeihan predicted severe starvation as a result of the Ukraine war but this is the first evidence I've seen of serious impact.  I'd hoped we were skating by on apocalyptic ramifications but based on your post, apparently we're not...  

In reply to stroker :

The Sudan coup predates the war in Ukraine.

I have spoken with someone who spent several years there in association with the UN and only left recently. Based on their comments and other reading, it's a pretty typical post-colonial war, with ancient tribal hatreds combining with current political rivalries and modern weapons. In food-scarce areas of the world, food has always been used (effectively) as a means of exerting pressure; this is no different.

The West is preoccupied with other conflicts right now, and there is a lot more to lose than there is to gain by trying to sort out Sudan. The UN has been wholly ineffective except in reporting on things and proclaiming them bad. The violence will stop when one side wins.

A bit of a depressing analysis from The Economist:

After 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties.

Russia is not without its own serious problems. Next year it will spend a third of its national budget on defence, starving the civilian economy in the process. Inflation is perhaps double the official annual rate of more than 8%. In 2025 ordinary Russian families will begin to feel the economic pain for the first time, says a European intelligence official, adding that there are early signs of war fatigue among those closely connected to the conflict, such as mothers and family members.

On the battlefield, Russia remains reliant on crude tactics that result in massive casualties. The decision to borrow thousands of North Korean troops, who are thought to be bound for the Kursk front, shows that Russian units are also stretched. Russia’s general staff and defence ministry have put “heavy pressure” on the Kremlin to mobilise more men, says the European official. “Russia now doesn’t have sufficient forces to mass,” says a senior nato official. “If they achieved a breakthrough they could not exploit it.” There is little short-term risk of Russian troops streaming west to Dnipro or Odessa.

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the nato official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-cling-on-not-to-win