In reply to 02Pilot :
To paraphrase the end of the video I linked, they did enough horrible things that there is no need to invent things the way Enemy at the Gates did.
In reply to Fueled by Caffeine :
My first response is embarrassingly cynical, but I'll still share it. At least he didn't blow up any apartment buildings.
Any minute now they'll declare the gunman to be a Ukrainian.
Izhevsk is even further from Ukraine than it is from Moscow. If this were a false-flag op, they could have chosen a more suitable location. The name of the shooter doesn't sound particularly Ukrainian to me, and he's dead, something operators try to avoid. Not to say it won't be exploited for whatever propaganda value can be squeezed out of it, but it's not the most obvious or effective way to run one of these. In addition, I do wonder if a segment of the Russian population has become (even more) skeptical of claims by its own government in light of events of the last few months.
In reply to Pete. (l33t FS) :
Sorry, I didn't have time to watch the video. Enemy at the Gates was a fairly ridiculous movie in a lot of ways. I still remember clearly a scene in the freezing winter of Stalingrad, where everyone is complaining about the cold, that has soldiers moving through an abandoned department store and there's a whole rack of fur coats just hanging there. Hollywood is about entertainment, not history.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Wait. You mean Jude law dosent make a convincing Russian soldier?
stroker
PowerDork
9/26/22 10:57 a.m.
02Pilot said:
tuna55 said:
02Pilot said:
Building up forces in Crimea makes zero sense for anything other than amphibious operations against the Ukrainian littoral (look at a map - the exits from Crimea are the definition of chokepoint), and I haven't seen any information suggesting that's likely. The satellite image looks like a training area more than anything else (PI is not something I'm formally trained in, but I do have an interest).
Increasing NATO QRF readiness status is not exactly a major step; it's more likely intended to reassure border state governments and give them something to point to when their people start screaming that the Russkis are coming (again). I do find it an interesting detail that Turkey is currently in command of the QRF.
I still contend this is posturing carried out simultaneously with negotiations in an effort to drive the public narrative, nothing more.
The last paragraph aged poorly
I hope now we could admit that Putin is obviously an irrational actor and will continue to act as such.
If anything, this has only served to strengthen Ukraine. They will be closer to the west than they ever had a chance of being before this conflict, and other Eastern European nations will notice this.
I'm not sure how far back you had to dig for this or exactly what your intent is in posting it, but I stand by every assessment I made at the time I made it, right or wrong. I continue to reject entirely the argument that Putin is an irrational actor - there is no significant evidence to support such an assertion if one considers the perspective from which he is operating. If one insists on applying the moralistic Western perspective of Wilsonian internationalism and a linear understanding of history, I can understand how it might look that way, but it should be fairly self-evident that this is not the approach with which Putin, or Russian leadership in general, align themselves. They are rational pragmatists - the fact that they have made numerous poor decisions does not change that; it just suggests that they failed to execute their plans successfully. If the execution had been successful, they would have achieved their war aims and altered the geopolitical balance in their favor - an entirely rational objective.
O2, I'd be curious about your impression of Jordan Peterson's analysis of Putin, here.
stroker
PowerDork
9/26/22 11:38 a.m.
In reply to Noddaz :
Man, that's an act I would not want to be caught doing...
I think in a few corners of Russia like Chechnya a recruiter may have very good reason to fear for his life even prior to telling the locals they have to go die for Putin.
In reply to stroker :
There was also this tidbit in the story:
The shooting comes after scattered arson attacks on enlistment offices and protests in Russian cities against the call-up that have resulted in at least 2,000 arrests.
stroker said:
O2, I'd be curious about your impression of Jordan Peterson's analysis of Putin, here.
It's a very made-for-TV presentation. He raises some interesting questions, but I don't find that he's really exploring the possible answers in great depth. It's more a stream of consciousness sort of monologue. As far as Putin specifically, I agree with his approach in a very general sense, but he doesn't consider the possibility of a negotiated peace at all, nor the leverage of the West on Ukrainian policy.
On a related note, I wonder if people are really paying attention to what Putin has been saying. The language he chooses is instructive. Take his meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi today (link to RT - interestingly, I could not find a Western source reporting this in any detail or providing quotes). The need for "respect" and being unwilling to tolerate "humiliation", along with reference back to 1991, just reinforces my feeling that this goes back to the way the Soviet Union collapsed, the lack of support from the West, and the expansion of NATO creating a sense of a Russia under attack. Clearly, that was not the Western intent, but we would do well to consider that intent and perception are not always perfectly aligned. Putin is clearly willing to take actions that serve his own interests and threaten others, and with a brutality not seen in many years, but it doesn't mean he's not after rational, real world objectives like any other leader.
Here is a bit more perspective on the Russian recruitment issue (basically, fundamental historical / transistional issues):
-----------------------
The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield. There are no rapid solutions to these problems.
The problems Putin confronts stem in part from long-standing unresolved tensions in the Russian approach to generating military manpower. Russian and Soviet military manpower policies from 1874 through 2008 were designed to support the full mass mobilization of the entire Russian and Soviet populations for full-scale war. Universal conscription and a minimum two-year service obligation was intended to ensure that virtually all military-age males received sufficient training and experience in combat specialties that they could be recalled to active service after serving their terms and rapidly go to war as effective soldiers. Most Russian and Soviet combat units were kept in a “cadre” status in peacetime—they retained a nearly full complement of officers and many non-commissioned officers, along with a small number of soldiers. Russian and Soviet doctrine and strategy required large-scale reserve mobilization to fill out these cadre units in wartime. This cadre-and-reserve approach to military manpower was common among continental European powers from the end of the 19th century through the Cold War.
The Russian military tried to move to an all-volunteer basis amid the 2008 financial crisis and failed to make the transition fully. The end of the Cold War and the demonstration in the 1991 Gulf War of the virtues of an all-volunteer military led many states to transition away from conscription models. The Russian military remained committed to the cadre-and-reserve model until 2008, when Putin directed his newly appointed Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov to move the Russian military to a professional model and reform it to save costs following the 2008 financial crisis.[1] One such cost-cutting measure reduced the term of mandatory conscript service to 18 months in 2007 and then to one year in 2008.
The Russian military ended up with a hybrid model blending conscript and professional soldiers. Professional militaries are expensive because the state must offer prospective voluntary recruits far higher salaries and benefits than it gives to conscripts, who have no choice but to serve. Serdyukov quickly found that the Russian defense budget could not afford to offer enticements sufficient to overcome the centuries-old Russian resistance to military service. The Russian military thus became a mix of volunteer professional soldiers, whom the Russians call kontraktniki, and one-year conscripts.
The reduction in the mandatory term of service for conscripts made Russia’s reserves less combat ready. Conscripts normally reach a bare minimum of military competence within a year—the lost second year is the period in which a cadre-and-reserve military would normally bring its conscripts to a meaningful level of combat capability. The shift to a one-year term of mandatory military service in 2008 means that the last classes of Russian men who served two-year terms are now in their early 30s. Younger men in the prime age brackets for being recalled to fight served only the abbreviated one-year period.
The prioritization of building a professional force and the de-prioritization of conscript service likely translated into an erosion of the bureaucratic structures required for mobilization. Mobilization is always a bureaucratically challenging undertaking. It requires local officials throughout the entire country to perform well a task they may never conduct and rehearse rarely, if at all. Maintaining the bureaucratic infrastructure required to conduct a large-scale reserve call-up requires considerable attention from senior leadership—attention it likely did not receive in Russia over the last 15 years or so.
02Pilot said:
stroker said:
O2, I'd be curious about your impression of Jordan Peterson's analysis of Putin, here.
It's a very made-for-TV presentation. He raises some interesting questions, but I don't find that he's really exploring the possible answers in great depth. It's more a stream of consciousness sort of monologue. As far as Putin specifically, I agree with his approach in a very general sense, but he doesn't consider the possibility of a negotiated peace at all, nor the leverage of the West on Ukrainian policy.
On a related note, I wonder if people are really paying attention to what Putin has been saying. The language he chooses is instructive. Take his meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi today (link to RT - interestingly, I could not find a Western source reporting this in any detail or providing quotes). The need for "respect" and being unwilling to tolerate "humiliation", along with reference back to 1991, just reinforces my feeling that this goes back to the way the Soviet Union collapsed, the lack of support from the West, and the expansion of NATO creating a sense of a Russia under attack. Clearly, that was not the Western intent, but we would do well to consider that intent and perception are not always perfectly aligned. Putin is clearly willing to take actions that serve his own interests and threaten others, and with a brutality not seen in many years, but it doesn't mean he's not after rational, real world objectives like any other leader.
I see your point and have considered it. Putin may very well have real world objectives and be taking steps to accomplish them. However, he seems to be suffering from a lack of real world awareness. He doesn't seem to see the economic and political losses Russia is incurring due to his actions and he obviously does not see the real world situation on the battlefield. Its perfectly fine to take action to accomplish his interests but if those interests are based in fantasy and not reality, it makes the actions seem irrational to those based in the real world.
tuna55
MegaDork
9/26/22 2:59 p.m.
gimpstang said:
02Pilot said:
stroker said:
O2, I'd be curious about your impression of Jordan Peterson's analysis of Putin, here.
It's a very made-for-TV presentation. He raises some interesting questions, but I don't find that he's really exploring the possible answers in great depth. It's more a stream of consciousness sort of monologue. As far as Putin specifically, I agree with his approach in a very general sense, but he doesn't consider the possibility of a negotiated peace at all, nor the leverage of the West on Ukrainian policy.
On a related note, I wonder if people are really paying attention to what Putin has been saying. The language he chooses is instructive. Take his meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi today (link to RT - interestingly, I could not find a Western source reporting this in any detail or providing quotes). The need for "respect" and being unwilling to tolerate "humiliation", along with reference back to 1991, just reinforces my feeling that this goes back to the way the Soviet Union collapsed, the lack of support from the West, and the expansion of NATO creating a sense of a Russia under attack. Clearly, that was not the Western intent, but we would do well to consider that intent and perception are not always perfectly aligned. Putin is clearly willing to take actions that serve his own interests and threaten others, and with a brutality not seen in many years, but it doesn't mean he's not after rational, real world objectives like any other leader.
I see your point and have considered it. Putin may very well have real world objectives and be taking steps to accomplish them. However, he seems to be suffering from a lack of real world awareness. He doesn't seem to see the economic and political losses Russia is incurring due to his actions and he obviously does not see the real world situation on the battlefield. Its perfectly fine to take action to accomplish his interests but if those interests are based in fantasy and not reality, it makes the actions seem irrational to those based in the real world.
I think the crux of our disagreement is the definition of the word rational. A guy walking down the street pushing an empty stroller and talking to an imaginary friend who happens to be a clown may be acting rationally to himself, but he is clearly not.
I do not view Putin as a rational actor. I suppose the alternative opinion is that he is making repeated terrible decisions. There may not be much difference from where we are sitting.
He's making very little progress, and losing blood and treasure to do it. He's embarrassing himself and his country, and causing untold humanitarian disasters.
Therefore I expect him to act irrationally in the future. Certainly the realist viewpoint hasn't accurately predicted his actions yet.
I said I expected him to use a tactical nuclear weapon way back in May, as an act of desperation. I still think that happens as they keep getting pushed back to holding just Crimea. They may claim it's an attack on Russian territory, but the world has been very clear that nobody buys it.
In reply to tuna55 :
So I agree with your view of Putin not being rational but I will add this:
Putin has lived in isolation for a VERY long time. He has autonomous power of one of the world's largest superpowers yet he is only allotted the information given to him by the people reporting to him which have all noticed the "gravity" of their positions in life. By gravity I mean if they tell Putin something that he may not want to hear they will be demonstrating gravity from a dozen floors up.
He is as rational as his self enabled situation allows. If he wasn't a murderous ex spy he probably wouldn't be in this position.
stroker
PowerDork
9/26/22 3:40 p.m.
I'm coming to the conclusion, based on the last couple of pages, that we're going to need to see something like "Gorbachev 2.0" in the Kremlin before things can stabilize safely...
tuna55
MegaDork
9/26/22 3:43 p.m.
stroker said:
I'm coming to the conclusion, based on the last couple of pages, that we're going to need to see something like "Gorbachev 2.0" in the Kremlin before things can stabilize safely...
Seriously. If someone pushed Putin out, declared an end to the war, said that they were going to reform the country and have free and democratic elections in six months, they would be the most popular leader in the world of all time.
tuna55 said:
stroker said:
I'm coming to the conclusion, based on the last couple of pages, that we're going to need to see something like "Gorbachev 2.0" in the Kremlin before things can stabilize safely...
Seriously. If someone pushed Putin out, declared an end to the war, said that they were going to reform the country and have free and democratic elections in six months, they would be the most popular leader in the world of all time.
Maybe not the most popular in Russia though, remember that at least before the new partial mobilization, around 2/3rds of Russians supported the war according to the best independent surveys available. A decent chunk of the population has clearly changed their minds since then, but it's possible that a majority would still support it. Also it's pretty clear that support for democracy is something of a niche issue there, and a large fraction of Russians see the faux-democratic authoritarianism as not a bug but a feature.
tuna55 said:
Seriously. If someone pushed Putin out, declared an end to the war, said that they were going to reform the country and have free and democratic elections in six months, they would be the most popular leader in the world of all time.
I am sure they will express that sentiment at his funeral 2 months after those statements.
There are a number of people, with a LOT of money and power, who are very interested in not seeing that happen. They would also very much like to show anyone the 5th floor window who would support that.
Of course, it could happen: No more corruption, free democratic elections. Well, the elections are already free and democratic, no need for change there (just kill the people who run you don't like). Corruption? Yes, "ding" solved. There you go. Anymore questions? I can answer any more questions you have up these stairs here...
Putin grants Russian citizenship to Edward Snowden.
How long until Snowden is drafted?
gimpstang said:
02Pilot said:
stroker said:
O2, I'd be curious about your impression of Jordan Peterson's analysis of Putin, here.
It's a very made-for-TV presentation. He raises some interesting questions, but I don't find that he's really exploring the possible answers in great depth. It's more a stream of consciousness sort of monologue. As far as Putin specifically, I agree with his approach in a very general sense, but he doesn't consider the possibility of a negotiated peace at all, nor the leverage of the West on Ukrainian policy.
On a related note, I wonder if people are really paying attention to what Putin has been saying. The language he chooses is instructive. Take his meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi today (link to RT - interestingly, I could not find a Western source reporting this in any detail or providing quotes). The need for "respect" and being unwilling to tolerate "humiliation", along with reference back to 1991, just reinforces my feeling that this goes back to the way the Soviet Union collapsed, the lack of support from the West, and the expansion of NATO creating a sense of a Russia under attack. Clearly, that was not the Western intent, but we would do well to consider that intent and perception are not always perfectly aligned. Putin is clearly willing to take actions that serve his own interests and threaten others, and with a brutality not seen in many years, but it doesn't mean he's not after rational, real world objectives like any other leader.
I see your point and have considered it. Putin may very well have real world objectives and be taking steps to accomplish them. However, he seems to be suffering from a lack of real world awareness. He doesn't seem to see the economic and political losses Russia is incurring due to his actions and he obviously does not see the real world situation on the battlefield. Its perfectly fine to take action to accomplish his interests but if those interests are based in fantasy and not reality, it makes the actions seem irrational to those based in the real world.
Alternatively, we may not fully understand his objectives. If you haven't already, watch that video with Steven Kotkin I posted a few pages back - his discussion of Stalin's logic in carrying out the Great Terror, an enormously self-destructive event, may be helpful in considering the thought processes endemic to Russian leaders.
That said, if the war ends with Putin having reduced the strength of his domestic opponents (who have been helpfully revealing themselves to authorities) and securing a deal that keeps Ukraine out of NATO, I would argue he could claim limited success on a grand strategic/international relations scale, despite the tactical and operational defeat. Yes, there will be many problems to overcome, but Chinese technology transfer and economic linkage will mitigate those (and the Chinese will not hesitate to support Russia more openly once hostilities end, provided Putin doesn't lob a nuke into Zelensky's oatmeal).
