Stalin's War goes into a lot of detail on the economic/production side of the equation, along with the diplomatic. I will just throw out a few tidbits that speak to points that were raised in the last page or so.
- Only 8-10% of Soviet industrial capacity was evacuated in 1941. Much of it was captured intact by the Germans, in some cases with the assistance of non-Russian Soviets: "(In Kharkov), Local Ukrainians had then exacted revenge on the departing Stalinist officials, who had ordered them to evacuate, by staying behind to disarm mines and explosives.... Many locals also turned over Soviet commissars and partisans to the Germans." (p.335)
- Raw materials were a huge need in the early phase of Lend-Lease: "...Soviet production of iron plunged by two-thirds from 1941 to 1942, steel and aluminum by 50 to 60 percent, and coal by more than half." (p.348) The US poured material into the Soviet Union, in spite of high demand at home: "Still more generous were the allotments fo American chemical, mineral, and metallic inputs for Stalin's war factories. These included monthly deliveries of armor plate (1,000 tons), sheet steel (8,000 tons), steel wire (7,000 tons), steel wire rope (1,200 tons), tool steel (500 tons), aluminum ingots (1,000 tons), duralumin (250 tons), tin (4,000 tons), tuloul (2,000 tons), ferro chrome (200 tons), ferro silicon (300 tons), rolled brass (5,000 tons), and copper tubes (300 tons). The first protocol stipulated that five hundred thousand tons of American goods would be shipped monthly until June 1942." (p.368)
- The shipping routes for Lend-Lease to the Soviet Arctic ports are well-known, but much was shipping to the Pacific port of Vladivostok, but the circumstances surrounding it give some significant insights into Stalin's mindset and ultimate objectives: "Shipping tanks, warplanes, trucks, and guns to Stalin via Vladivostok, after the Vozhd (Stalin) relented and authorized this in January 1942, was no picnic either. There was a rich irony in Stalin's reversal on the Pacific route. Before Pearl Harbor, when the Neutrality Act was in force, the waters around Vladivostok were not a war zone. Lend-lease shipments could have proceeded there without legal complications of danger of engagement by hostile navies. But Stalin ruled this out, demanding that Roosevelt sidestep the Neutrality Act and ship was supplies via the U-boat-infested waters of the North Atlantic and Arctic instead. Now that the United States was at war with Japan - a country scarcely five hundred miles from the Soviet Far East, with its home islands sitting squarely astride the principal sea lanes - the route to Vladivostok was a perilous as could possibly be imagined, an obvious war zone.That Stalin gave his blessing to this route now, after insisting on the more dangerous and legally dubious Arctic option when the Pacific had been safer and legal, suggests either that he actually wanted American capitalists to die at sea while supplying his armies, or that he was playing a wicked joke at Roosevelt's expense. On the other hand, Stalin may have known something about Japan that Roosevelt did not, owing to his April 1941 neutrality pact with Tokyo. It turned out that Japan's Pacific Fleet commanders - keen to keep Stalin content, and not unhappy that the Americans were undermining their own war effort - took an indulgent view toward convoys heading for Vladivostok in 1942. Nor did anyone in the Japanese admiralty bother to humor Hitler's request that Japanese vessels block shipments of American war material to Stalin. When the Japanese Navy later stopped a few US merchant vessels in Japanese territorial waters, (Harry) Hopkins's lend-lease officials conceived a solution emblematic of Roosevelt's self-effacing relations with Stalin: they transferred title to fifty-seven American merchant vessels used in the Pacific Ocean to Soviet Russia, so that the Japanese would not bother them." (p.394-5)
Obviously, this is just the tip of the iceberg, but offers a sample of the kind of thing McMeekin discusses in his book.