This is an interesting, if certain to be controversial, article from The National Interest: Lessons from the Melian Dialogue: A Case Against Providing Military Support for Ukraine
This is an interesting, if certain to be controversial, article from The National Interest: Lessons from the Melian Dialogue: A Case Against Providing Military Support for Ukraine
In reply to 02Pilot :
Magazine was started by a dude name of Dick Nixon. Some might remember him and his credentials.
Later editor went on to argue:
The National Interest is credited with introducing ideas like "the West and the rest" and geoeconomics into public discourse.[3] Political scientist Francis Fukuyama formulated his early political and philosophical thoughts on the end of history in the journal in 1989, where he argued that the worldwide spread of liberal democracies and free-market capitalism of the West and its lifestyle may signal the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and become the final form of human government
Going to have to take a long hard pass on any prose with that kind of editorial background.
Not sure Bakhmut is lost quite yet.
The Wagner group are running out of ammo and the Ukraine is not to the point where they are worried about being cut off or they would have left already. There is another story about the Russians recruits being shown how to use their shovels as combat weapons.
However the war turns out, I do not see that Russia will be big enough for both Putin and Prigozhin going forward. That should be interesting.
In reply to NOHOME :
I'm well aware of how TNI came to be and its history - I've been reading it for decades. It was founded by Irving Kristol, but later acquired by a think-tank set up by Nixon. It is a serious academic journal, not just a lock-step ideological mouthpiece, and certainly offers a rather diverse set of perspectives. The fact the Fukayama, a strong Wilsonian idealist, was published under the same banner as a very realist piece like the one I linked to should make that clear.
On Nixon (briefly, so as not to get too sidetracked here), everyone remembers him for Watergate, but recall that his first term was quite successful, so much so that by Nov 1972 he had made real progress of drawing down Vietnam, improving relations with both the Soviets and the Chinese, and reducing - at least among the non-radicalized portion of the population - some of the division in American society. He won 49 out of 50 states.
In reply to 02Pilot :
If Nixon hadn't given in to paranoia he might be considered one of the greatest presidents of the 20th century.
So, 60 minutes (who sometimes don't show just murder trials) had a segment on Ukrainians prisoner of war, specifically female prisoners of war (captured in Muriupol). It wasn't terribly in depth and just talked to three that were recently released and their general story. It did have one part that was particularly, uhm, harsh:
A previous prisoner was talking about her experience in captivity. She noted that the Russians did not rape the female Ukrainian prisoners. They... very much audible to the rest of the prison.... raped the male prisoners.
As noted above, it looks like the encirclement of Bahkmut is not exactly proceeding quickly and might have stalled. The Ukrainians seem prepared to make them pay that much more.
The Wagner leader was apparently complaining on Telegram that he did not have enough trucks to remove the Russian dead.
A video on Telegram showed a captured and unarmed Ukrainian smoking a cigarette. He said "Slava Ukraini", and they shot him. Looked a bit like he knew they planned to shot him.
I'll post up a video about the Tankenstein later (I can't post from the work PC)- that gun used is a WW2 anti-aircraft gun who's ammo hasn't been made since 1984. I'm not sure if it's real, or if the conscript charges are THAT desperate that they're demanding every possible method of supressive fire.
NOHOME said:In reply to 02Pilot :
Magazine was started by a dude name of Dick Nixon. Some might remember him and his credentials.
Later editor went on to argue:
The National Interest is credited with introducing ideas like "the West and the rest" and geoeconomics into public discourse.[3] Political scientist Francis Fukuyama formulated his early political and philosophical thoughts on the end of history in the journal in 1989, where he argued that the worldwide spread of liberal democracies and free-market capitalism of the West and its lifestyle may signal the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and become the final form of human government
Going to have to take a long hard pass on any prose with that kind of editorial background.
To add onto that, Nixon was a "Realist" in the school of Geopolitcs, which preached and believed that the future world order was going to be the spheres of the USA versus the USSR, and in Nixon's own terms were going to be that way for hundreds of years. The problem of course, is that the USSR is gone. Kraut's video here I think, does a complete takedown of the school of thought since he also reads directly from it and shows where history has clearly diverged from what it assumed.
Some comments on Bakhmut and the possibility that Ukraines stubborn defence might jepardize a future offensive:
The mercenary fighters typically move on Ukrainian positions early in the morning, he said, attempting attacks in irregular and unpredictable patterns, seemingly without any clear strategy, which makes them seem “unprepared” for battle.
It is only later in the day that better-trained Russian forces often enter the fray, seeking to make a real advance.
“Wagner and the mobilized are being just thrown like meat” toward the front line, Vatagin said.
Despite reports of complaints from Ukrainian soldiers that they are fighting under desperate and untenable conditions, and military experts insisting that Bakhmut is of little long-term strategic value to Russia, Zelensky’s office issued a statement saying that Valery Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian military commander in chief, and Oleksandr Syrsky, the commander of ground forces, who is directing operations in the east, had each endorsed reinforcing and continuing the city’s defense.
But Kofman suggested the time had come to think of saving troops and resources for a future offensive, noting in a tweet that “strategies can reach points of diminishing returns, and … it could impede the success of a more important operation.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/06/bakhmut-wagner-mercenaries-russia-ukraine/
I think this may have been mentioned here before, but am not sure, and saw a video that reminded me of it. If Ukraine is not defended, that nuclear proliferation could become an issue as smaller nations need some sort of force multiplier to keep large, nuclear-armed nations from invading. Kind of makes me wonder whether it is being considered in Taiwan.
Nukes do effectively give you the "Cannot be Invaded" card.
It's essentially what the North Koreans and Iranians want them for.
I am sure the Taiwanese would LOVE to have nukes! But man, the hissy fits China throws for even hints of support of Taiwan (or even just calling it Taiwan), I cannot imagine what they might do if there was a possibility Taiwan might get nukes. Might be a way to actually get them to invade.
In reply to GIRTHQUAKE :
Well, I've never heard of "Kraut" or seen his work, but his is certainly is a large step above most of the drivel inhabiting YouTube. His explanation of realism as a theory isn't bad at all, though I think he views it too narrowly at the end, wherein he basically restricts it to the bi-polar Cold War era; it's overly reductive to exclude centuries of history in which the nation-state dominated international relations. Realism operates at all levels of national sovereignty, not just among the Great Powers; it is simply that the Great Powers have the most options available to pursue their objectives.
To his criticisms:
I do not accept his point on Islamism invalidating realism because it is a non-national force. Again, due to his narrowing of the time frame, he conveniently excludes other non-national forces that interacted with nation-states in early periods. Pre-1917 Bolshevism is a perfect example of a movement that transcended national boundaries, but was still a factor with which national governments had to deal individually.
Further, he uses Islamism to suggest that ideologies do matter, but (as he noted earlier) realists do not disagree with this on a national level, but only internationally. The absence of a unified Islamist state or other political union (discounting the ill-fated United Arab Republic that only lasted three years), and the fact that plenty of countries with Islamist governments have pursued their own interests and fought with other Islamist states. What have they fought over? Their own national interests. The same is true of organized labor movements in 1914 - universally, they cast off their internationalist convictions in exchange for support for their respective national interests.
On the death of communism, he is looking at it as if the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union somehow invalidated the idea of a world in conflict. Has he not noticed that Russia is once again playing an international role commensurate with its size? As far as the EU, sure, it's helped to maintain the peace in Europe for ~50 years. So what? The realist-based Concert of Europe avoided major conflict for a century (comparing the small wars of the 19th Century to something on the scale and existential danger of the Napoleonic Wars, which it was focused on, is apples and oranges). It is fantasy to think that the EU is a substitute for real power. Remove NATO and the US nuclear umbrella and the EU is remarkably vulnerable to outside forces - military or otherwise - and has little ability to pursue and protect its interests.
The criticism of Bismarck is rather odd. Bismarck built a German state; Wilhelm II tried to build a German Empire. Bismarck's limited objectives, had they been continued as policy, could have prevented the crises that raised tensions and eventually led to the outbreak of WWI as a Europe-wide conflict, crises that were virtually all related to Wilhelm's policies of extra-European imperialism, something Bismarck had consciously rejected. If there is a criticism of Bismarck, it is that his intricate system of balancing required a hand as skilled as his own to manage, something Wilhelm certainly did not possess.
There is certainly going to be a difference of perspective coming from an institutional economist, a discipline that goes hand in hand with liberal internationalism. He rightly points out that realism cannot account for all circumstances or factors, but I don't know of any field of social science that claims it can. Realist predictive models work when applied, as intended, to sovereign nation-states; they become weaker and more problematic as they move further from that ideal model. His discussion of Metternich is correct in that he was very much a realist, but Austria-Hungary was far from a nation-state; it incorporated numerous national groups, each with its own motives. Bismarck's Germany, on the other hand, was much closer to the ideal case, and as such suffered fewer such pressures (though it still had to deal with class issues and pressures from liberals). Fundamentally, however, no matter what those internal pressures and influences, national interests remained the same, and a realist leader would contend with them in a similar fashion, regardless of domestic concerns.
Finally, his whole discussion about "Who gets to be a Great Power" is a fairly silly distraction that seems to be intended to negatively associate realism with a number of unpopular concepts such as imperialism. Sure, some countries don't want to be "poker chips" in his preferred idiom, but he fails to acknowledge the basic fact that the choice is not theirs alone, or in some cases even at all. No matter how you slice it, the equation is always the same: The strong do as they will, and the weak suffer as they must.
Though I disagree with his perspective almost completely, it's certainly a thorough examination and an interesting discussion. Thanks for posting it.
An assessment of the Russian situation. Which leads to the obvious case that the Russians are likely to be fully defensive in the summer and the question if the Ukrainians will be able to punch a hole in them somewhere.
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Russian forces additionally likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare. Recent Russian advances within urban areas of Bakhmut demonstrate that Russian forces can secure limited tactical gains with infantry-led frontal assaults.[4] Russian forces likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to exploit the roads (which are likely highly fortified) west of Bakhmut. As ISW has recently reported, Russian forces are increasingly relying on “assault detachments,” a battalion-size element optimized for frontal assaults on fortified areas, rather than for maneuver warfare.[5] These detachments are artillery-heavy, use simplified tactics, relegate tanks to a fire support role in rear areas, and would almost certainly struggle to effectively conduct operations beyond urban areas. A prominent Russian milblogger echoed this observation on March 7, noting that assault detachments are simply too small to “punch a wide and deep gap” in Ukrainian defensive formations and follow with tank and mechanized battalions, and called for the formation of “breakthrough brigades,” a change likely far beyond the current capabilities of Russian forces in the area.[6] The continuing devolution of Russian force structure towards small assault detachments using simplified tactics, combined with mounting losses among the most effective Russian troops, will likely greatly limit the ability of Russian forces to properly exploit any paths of advance opened by the capture of Bakhmut. Russian forces remain unlikely to secure more than a tactical victory following 10 months of assaults.
In reply to VolvoHeretic :
You never know when you might need to peek in a second story window from a tank.
Poor Wagnerite leader Prigozhin the Chef. Hope he winds up with a hammer blow to the head.
Prigozhin’s Wagner approaching collapse, lost almost all of its mercenaries – Cherevaty
So much for Russia's economy being unaffected by sanctions:
https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/09/business/russia-sberbank-profit-plunge-sanctions/index.html
In reply to GameboyRMH :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B643JWVOO2g
Above link: Interesting point about Russia (in)ability to sell non-liquefied NG.
Interestingly enough I just saw some (not reliable at all source obviously) state that the Russian economy is "booming"
I guess the question would be, what exactly happens if the Russian economy actually "collapses" (whatever that actually means). Do you have any insight to that at all 02?
It is quite amazing. I mean you do have to have some respect for what ever ability it is. The Russian military and economy seems to have been on the brink of collapse for quite some time now and yet keeps moving (though even more serious cracks seem to be appearing)
Some minor updates:
- Apparently another missile spasm by Russia which disrupted power and internet in Ukraine
- Two cargo ships full of munitions (probably mostly artillery shells and missiles) have been shipped from Iran to Russia. Not sure how long that would take to get to the front lines, maybe two weeks?
- The situation in Bakhmut remains, somewhat amazing, the same. I mean, the would be an absolute slam dunk, "it's done" situation normally!!
Prigozhin (Wagner) was shown complaining how they have almost no artillery shells left. As you can see by the map below, entering the town seems to be the issue. The Ukrainians have established a defensive line at the river (the straight line at the right) and seem to just want to bleed the Russians.
Stalingrad right back at you bitches! (and remember the aftermath of Stalingrad was a Russian offensive that encircled the overly aggressive Germans)
In reply to aircooled :
I have opined this before and will again now.
They seem to be doing their damndest to speedrun the losing side of WWII.
Pete. (l33t FS) said:In reply to aircooled :
I have opined this before and will again now.
They seem to be doing their damndest to speedrun the losing side of WWII.
The Russians will also always use their best WWII tactic in any war, throw as many troops into the meat grinder until the desired outcome is achieved, regardless of their comabit abilities.
Russia has now lost it's 1,000th T-72.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html?m=1
aircooled said:Above link: Interesting point about Russia (in)ability to sell non-liquefied NG.
(link redacted)
Interestingly enough I just saw some (not reliable at all source obviously) state that the Russian economy is "booming"
I guess the question would be, what exactly happens if the Russian economy actually "collapses" (whatever that actually means). Do you have any insight to that at all 02?
I don't think it's anywhere near collapsing. There are a few factors that suggest this. The ruble has regained basically everything it lost after the war started. As shown in the chart, there are some wild fluctuations, but if you look at the exchange rate pre-war and now, they're not that different. Further, Russia has shifted a considerable portion of its foreign currency dealings to the yuan, and that can only be expected to accelerate.
Generally speaking, an economic collapse begins with defaulting on government debt, which in turn tends to have all sorts of nasty effects: bank runs, the inability to borrow (or only at exhorbitant rates), massive inflation, etc. China's willingness to turn Russia's economy toward the yuan mitigates the risk of all of these things...just as long as the Chinese are happy to play along. Right now, Putin has few choices, but in the long-term, particularly if China finds itself in a period of diplomatic escalation with the US, there could be ugliness. It should be noted that China still relies heavily on dollar and Euro exchange to do business in its primary markets; if those become problematic, there is no way on earth that the US and the EU are going to move toward the yuan as Russia has, in which case China may find itself more economically isolated that is sustainable, at least on its current export-driven economic model.
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