History in the Making: Russian Invasion

02Pilot said:

aircooled said:

Above link:   Interesting point about Russia (in)ability to sell non-liquefied NG.

(link redacted)

Interestingly enough I just saw some (not reliable at all source obviously) state that the Russian economy is "booming"

I guess the question would be, what exactly happens if the Russian economy actually "collapses" (whatever that actually means).  Do you have any insight to that at all 02?

I don't think it's anywhere near collapsing. There are a few factors that suggest this. The ruble has regained basically everything it lost after the war started. As shown in the chart, there are some wild fluctuations, but if you look at the exchange rate pre-war and now, they're not that different. Further, Russia has shifted a considerable portion of its foreign currency dealings to the yuan, and that can only be expected to accelerate.

Generally speaking, an economic collapse begins with defaulting on government debt, which in turn tends to have all sorts of nasty effects: bank runs, the inability to borrow (or only at exhorbitant rates), massive inflation, etc. China's willingness to turn Russia's economy toward the yuan mitigates the risk of all of these things...just as long as the Chinese are happy to play along. Right now, Putin has few choices, but in the long-term, particularly if China finds itself in a period of diplomatic escalation with the US, there could be ugliness. It should be noted that China still relies heavily on dollar and Euro exchange to do business in its primary markets; if those become problematic, there is no way on earth that the US and the EU are going to move toward the yuan as Russia has, in which case China may find itself more economically isolated that is sustainable, at least on its current export-driven economic model.

The US is already rattling their sanction sabres at China, and China if nothing else is pragmatic. They have some upside to helping Russia out to a point but the moment it starts to put a dent in their economy Putin will begin to find that phone calls are not returned and China magically needs less oil than they did. I expect given a stark choice between the US and Russia as a future trading partner they will make the right decision. China does not need to publicly pick a side. They just need to curb the flow of yuan and Russia would be in deep trouble at that point.

02Pilot said:

aircooled said:

Above link:   Interesting point about Russia (in)ability to sell non-liquefied NG.

(link redacted)

Interestingly enough I just saw some (not reliable at all source obviously) state that the Russian economy is "booming"

I guess the question would be, what exactly happens if the Russian economy actually "collapses" (whatever that actually means).  Do you have any insight to that at all 02?

I don't think it's anywhere near collapsing. There are a few factors that suggest this. The ruble has regained basically everything it lost after the war started. As shown in the chart, there are some wild fluctuations, but if you look at the exchange rate pre-war and now, they're not that different. Further, Russia has shifted a considerable portion of its foreign currency dealings to the yuan, and that can only be expected to accelerate.

Generally speaking, an economic collapse begins with defaulting on government debt, which in turn tends to have all sorts of nasty effects: bank runs, the inability to borrow (or only at exhorbitant rates), massive inflation, etc. China's willingness to turn Russia's economy toward the yuan mitigates the risk of all of these things...just as long as the Chinese are happy to play along. Right now, Putin has few choices, but in the long-term, particularly if China finds itself in a period of diplomatic escalation with the US, there could be ugliness. It should be noted that China still relies heavily on dollar and Euro exchange to do business in its primary markets; if those become problematic, there is no way on earth that the US and the EU are going to move toward the yuan as Russia has, in which case China may find itself more economically isolated that is sustainable, at least on its current export-driven economic model.

Is there any reliable information on how much of Russian financial (e.g. gold) reserves were used to prop up the Ruble?  They can only do that a finite number of times.

I'm genuinely not trying to be argumentative, but isn't saying the Russians moving to the Yuan as evidence of financial health about the same thing as saying the US moving to the Mexican Peso for international currency dealings about the same principle...?  If the Ruble were truly healthy they shouldn't need to do that, should they?  I'm not hearing that the flow of Yuan from China (via suitcase or any other means) is slowing appreciably, either. 

This whole situation reminds me of 1990--the Russian economy was "fine" until suddenly, it wasn't. 

bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) said:

....They have some upside to helping Russia out to a point but the moment it starts to put a dent in their economy Putin will begin to find that phone calls are not returned and China magically needs less oil than they did.....

Yeah, that is an interesting take on it.   China seems to be showing signs of wanting this to end, maybe for the exact reason you note.  Like it or not, currently, China and the US have a rather large interconnection, and those upsides and downsides go both ways.

stroker said:

02Pilot said:

aircooled said:

Above link:   Interesting point about Russia (in)ability to sell non-liquefied NG.

(link redacted)

Interestingly enough I just saw some (not reliable at all source obviously) state that the Russian economy is "booming"

I guess the question would be, what exactly happens if the Russian economy actually "collapses" (whatever that actually means).  Do you have any insight to that at all 02?

I don't think it's anywhere near collapsing. There are a few factors that suggest this. The ruble has regained basically everything it lost after the war started. As shown in the chart, there are some wild fluctuations, but if you look at the exchange rate pre-war and now, they're not that different. Further, Russia has shifted a considerable portion of its foreign currency dealings to the yuan, and that can only be expected to accelerate.

Generally speaking, an economic collapse begins with defaulting on government debt, which in turn tends to have all sorts of nasty effects: bank runs, the inability to borrow (or only at exhorbitant rates), massive inflation, etc. China's willingness to turn Russia's economy toward the yuan mitigates the risk of all of these things...just as long as the Chinese are happy to play along. Right now, Putin has few choices, but in the long-term, particularly if China finds itself in a period of diplomatic escalation with the US, there could be ugliness. It should be noted that China still relies heavily on dollar and Euro exchange to do business in its primary markets; if those become problematic, there is no way on earth that the US and the EU are going to move toward the yuan as Russia has, in which case China may find itself more economically isolated that is sustainable, at least on its current export-driven economic model.

Is there any reliable information on how much of Russian financial (e.g. gold) reserves were used to prop up the Ruble?  They can only do that a finite number of times.

I'm genuinely not trying to be argumentative, but isn't saying the Russians moving to the Yuan as evidence of financial health about the same thing as saying the US moving to the Mexican Peso for international currency dealings about the same principle...?  If the Ruble were truly healthy they shouldn't need to do that, should they?  I'm not hearing that the flow of Yuan from China (via suitcase or any other means) is slowing appreciably, either. 

This whole situation reminds me of 1990--the Russian economy was "fine" until suddenly, it wasn't. 

The yuan isn't exactly a minor currency, but it is certainly not in the same class as the dollar. For bilateral Russia-China trade, however, this is of limited consequence. There have been suggestions that even within China there are concerns about the long-term stability of the yuan. But that's not particularly relevant to Russia right now.

I never said the ruble was healthy; I said I don't see the Russian economy on the verge of collapse. Russia is not a wealthy country, and most of its population is accustomed to that. At the moment, I don't imagine there are many there who are gripped by the optimism of the early 90s. The average Russian can muddle through as they are for a good long time.

Yeah, because killing the leader of the Russian allied state bordering them makes sense....

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The Transnistrian occupation government accused the Ukrainian government of plotting to kill Transnistria’s president, likely as part of the ongoing Russian information operations to undermine Ukrainian credibility and destabilize Moldova. The Transnistrian occupation Ministry of Security Services accused six people, including Ukrainian nationals and Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) personnel, on March 9 of plotting to assassinate senior Transnistrian occupation officials and the occupation head Vadim Krasnoselsky.[30] The SBU stated that the Transnistrian authorities’ accusation is a Kremlin information provocation.[31] ISW has previously reported on increasing Russian information efforts to destabilize Moldova and even draw Transnistria into the war.[32] The Kremlin also tried to undermine Ukraine’s credibility through the recent claimed border incursions in Bryansk Oblast.[33]

More detail on the recent missile strike.  One has to wonder what they targeted with the Kinzhals (hypersonic) since they know they cannot really be intercepted.  Not sure how pinpoint accurate they are either.

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Russian forces conducted the largest missile strike across Ukraine of 2023 so far on March 9, but the attack likely only served Russian state propaganda objectives. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure with 84 different missiles including 28 Kh-101/Kh-555 and 20 Kalibr cruise missiles, six Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, six Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, two Kh-31P supersonic anti-ship missiles, six Kh-59 guided missiles, and at least 13 S-300 air-defense missiles.[1] Russian forces also attacked Ukraine with eight Iranian-made Shahed–136 drones, which Ukrainian officials noted likely sought to distract Ukrainian air defense systems before the missile strikes.[2] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 34 of the 48 Kalibr and Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Shahed-136 drones.[3] Ukrainian officials also noted that all eight of the Kh-31P and Kh-59 missiles did not reach their intended targets. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces did not have the capacity to shoot down some of the Russian missiles—likely referring to Kinzhal and S-300 missiles.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted “high precision long range air, sea, and land-based missile strikes” targeting Ukrainian military infrastructure, military-industrial complexes, and energy infrastructure supporting the Ukrainian military as retaliation for the alleged incursion into Bryansk Oblast on March 2.[5]

Ukrainian officials, Russian milbloggers, and social media footage indicate that Russian forces overwhelmingly targeted energy infrastructure across Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrynskyi, stated that Russian missile strikes once again targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but yet again failed to achieve Russia’s ongoing goal of destroying Ukrainian power supplies.[6] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Russian strikes hit eight energy sites resulting in power outages in some areas of the country.[7] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that preliminary data showed that Russian forces may have used Kinzhal missiles to strike unspecified infrastructure, while social media footage showed smoke rising from one of Kyiv’s thermo-electric power plants.[8] Russian milbloggers amplified footage and reports of the aftermath of strikes on energy facilities in the cities of Kyiv, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, Odesa, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv among others.[9] ISW continues to assess that these missile strikes will not undermine Ukraine’s will or improve Russia’s positions on the frontlines.

Very interesting video that explains the concept of "smekalka", which is technically a good thing, but is used in not so good ways.

The video explains better,  but the general concept is that of coming up with an expedient solution in an emergency.

This is used by the military brass to get away with things like saying "We only issue you uniforms.  Food, weapons, ammunition, medical supplies? You are Russians, you have smekalka!  You are smart enough to figure out how to get those things on your own!"  (actual video clip included)

Puts a lot of things into perspective.

Smekalka is an interesting concept and pretty funny considering it's time with communism and what it is supposed to provide, although likely very necessary considering the realities of communism(!)

This is an interesting observation.  It appears as if the Russians are putting some effort into defending the Russian boarder with Ukraine.  This of course could be an indication of a lack of confidence, but it clearly seems to indicate they are believing their own BS that there is any realistic chance Ukraine would ever advance into Russian territory.  Belgorod Oblast BTW is the Russian Oblast east of Kharkiv, in the north east of Ukraine (which would be in the direction of Moscow).

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Russian forces continue to establish defensive lines in rear areas far from current frontlines and areas in Russia that will likely never see fighting. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on March 9 that Russian authorities finished constructing the “zasechnaya line” of fortifications along Belgorod Oblast’s border with Ukraine.[4] Gladkov claimed that Russian forces should dedicate troops to defending this system of fortifications in case of an implausible Ukrainian attack on Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces would significantly misallocate forces that would be better suited supporting active offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine by manning these fortifications. Gladkov also claimed that Russian officials spent 10 billion rubles (about $132 million) constructing the defensive line, a likely waste of funds amid questions about Russia’s ability to fund its war effort in Ukraine.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on March 10 that Russian forces continued building fortifications along Kursk Oblast‘s border with Ukraine, another area that will likely never see fighting.[6] Occupied Crimea head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on March 10 that Russian forces are constructing a defensive line in Crimea and implied that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the construction of the line.[7] These fortifications are far away from the current frontlines in southern Ukraine, and any Russian personnel and equipment deployed to these lines would similarly be better suited elsewhere in Ukraine. Russian officials in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts may be constructing defensive fortifications in support of information operations that aim to portray Ukraine as threatening Russian territory in order to frame the war in Ukraine as existential for Russia. Continued Russian fortifications in Crimea may suggest that Russian forces are unsure of their ability to hold occupied territories in southern Ukraine in the long term. ISW has not observed Russian forces deployed to any of these defensive lines at this time, and the fortifications are therefore currently inconsequential for Russian operations in Ukraine.

I suspect some here will find this interesting.

stroker said:

I suspect some here will find this interesting.

Seems extremely pro Russian and actually indefensible. Russia can coalesce all it wants around the fear of a Ukraine invasion, but since Ukraine will never cross the border, they will waste their time and resources. While it is true that the US and British get much of their intelligence from Kiev, events thus far have corroborated the information, otherwise the war would be long over and Ukriane would now be Russian. A current example is Bakhmut, which is now being reinforced by Ukraine. They would not expend their short supply of soldiers unless they were confident they were giving much more than they were getting. In other words it is pretty clear that the Ukraine is in fact if not beating Russia, then at least giving a pretty dang good account of themselves. That is not just Western propaganda. 

In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :

He lost me when he tried to equate everything to our governments attempt to slow the spread of Covid 19. The government's quarantines were done to try and not overwhelm the medical system which was totally unprepared for a pandemic and which kept our death toll in the low 1 millions instead of multi millions. It would have been a much better outcome if not for the fact that an entire political class refused to heed the warnings and recommendations of the health department.

In reply to stroker :

I do find it interesting when looking at such articles, to look at what else the site is reporting.  It's pretty obvious that sight has a particular "angle".  That does not invalidate the opinion, but does imply some irony in the point of the opinion which is (essentially) "only reporting what they want you to report".

I certainly have no expertise in intelligence gathering in Ukraine but I find it VERY hard to believe all the western intelligence gathering almost entirely relies on what Ukraine tells them.  Firstly, the US, at least, is certainly in place Ukraine (not officially, militarily of course) and I am sure is well aware of the skill of "marketing" that Ukraine has.  I mean, it's kind of their job.  I can also guarantee that the US is gathering a LOT of intelligence through signals monitoring and radar (e.g. JSTARS) and there is zero reason this would be influenced by Ukraine.

That being said, I am sure Western intelligence is playing along a bit with Ukraine, and in the same way Ukraine is following suggestions from the west.  That of course is all part of the "game".  You rarely want the other side to know what you know and many times want to imply some "mis-truths"(!) and I am sure that is where some of the suspicion is coming from.

There is a bunch of unrelated political fluff in there, but it appears the main point is we are voluntarily or involuntarily engaging in propaganda to help the Ukrainian side. If you think the US isnt engaging is propaganda to further their aims, you are incorrect, literally everyone does.

Not that I agree with everything he says but he makes some decent points, some of the things Ive mentioned in this thread.

Things you hear a bunch. Russian economy is on the verge of collapse. The ruble is worthless. Ukraine is winning and its almost over. Russia is out of soldiers. No one is buying Russian exports. Most of the American narrative is exaggerated or just plain wrong.

Im not saying Russia is winning or will win or is even in a great position, but the conversation has much more nuance than routinely happens.

We are not above propaganda.

Also the point he made about if you are against the mainstream narrative you are immediately labeled as pro Russia, was illustrated by literally the first response in this thread.

I would absolutely never assume the US and the West are NOT engaging in propaganda.  As I think I make a note of, it is very much a integral part of the intelligence "game" and is also very justifiable.

I would say it's absurd to think any intelligence organization is not engaging in deception, again, it's essential part of their job. I think I have made the point a number of times in this thread that it much be kept in mind that not only can Russians sources not really be trusted, Ukrainian sourced are almost as suspect (e.g. there are almost zero published casualty / loss reports for Ukraine, for some pretty understandable reasons)

The part of the article I take issue with is that the US is essentially relying on Ukraine for their intelligence narrative (both lies and truths).  I find that very hard to believe.

In reply to aircooled :

I wasnt talking about you specifically. As you stated in your post its part of the game. I think youve been pretty fair in your commentary, which largely seems to be reporting, even though I dont completely agree with everything, but thats based on our personal opinions on what should happen or will happen and not based on factual claims about what is happening.

As a note to your last point, I think there is two parts to "us intelligence coming from Kyiv." It is hard to believe the US govt is completely at the mercy of Kyiv for intelligence, BUT that doesnt mean the US govt is releasing the intelligence it gathers, and its not hard to believe that the American people are at the mercy of what Kyiv releases, for reasons we already mentioned, propaganda. What the US goverment get and what the American people get are two separate issues but related so I understand why they get lumped into one thing.

Opti said:

......Also the point he made about if you are against the mainstream narrative you are immediately labeled as pro Russia, was illustrated by literally the first response in this thread.

I should point out that, for obvious reasons, they can be hard to differentiate because sometimes they are essentially the same. There is also the worry of intelligence manipulation that is "infecting" news narratives (which I think I have seen some pretty clear evidence of a few times).  But, like many things, just because you might agree with Russia on some things does NOT mean you are "pro Russian". 

There is essentially no one or no nation who/that is all right, or all wrong.

To use the absurd example.  I can refer to something Hitler has done as a "smart move" (getting the west to give him someone else's country).  It, in no way, means I am pro Hitler.

I should also point out that automatically discounting something because if it's source is a bit ignorant.  Certainly, a higher level of suspicion is warranted in many cases (e.g. Putin!), but discounting it is a bad idea (and could even be used as a weapon / technique against you).

In reply to aircooled :

I completely agree. 

The "Pro Russia" response just seems so prevalent in this situation. I get that some people are literally pro Russia, but my experience has been if you differ from the mainstream narrative at all a common first response is that you are supporting Russia. Its happened multiple times in this thread. I enjoy debate and understand that many people will not share my opinions which is fine, but it seems like the pro Russia response is used as a way to straw man an argument and avoid an actual conversation which is the opposite of what we need in the case of geopolitics, where as you mentioned "there is essentially no one or no nation who/that is all right, or all wrong."

More signs of Russia imminent collapse... or not.  As noted at the end (and relevant to the previous posts) one wonders why they would admit such things.  Could just be an attempt to shift blame (i.e. "wasn't us").

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Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in the Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian information space, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently cannot readily fix it. Kremlin journalists, academics, and Novorossiya supporters held a forum on the “practical and technological aspects of information and cognitive warfare in modern realities” in Moscow on March 11.[2] During a panel discussion Zakharova stated that the Kremlin cannot replicate the Stalinist approach of establishing a modern equivalent to the Soviet Information Bureau to centrally control Russia’s internal information space due to fighting among unspecified Kremlin “elites.”[3]

Zakharova’s statement is noteworthy and supports several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about deteriorating Kremlin regime and information space control dynamics. The statement supports several assessments: that there is Kremlin infighting between key members of Putin’s inner circle; that Putin has largely ceded the Russian information space over time to a variety of quasi-independent actors; and that Putin is apparently unable to take decisive action to regain control over the Russian information space.[4] It is unclear why Zakharova — a seasoned senior spokesperson — would have openly acknowledged these problems in a public setting. Zakharova may have directly discussed these problems for the first time to temper Russian nationalist milbloggers’ expectations regarding the current capabilities of the Kremlin to cohere around a unified narrative — or possibly even a unified policy.

The trouble with any kind of Kremlin power struggle is that the potential winners are more hawkish than Putin. Are there even any moderates in the Kremlin?

It's starting to sound like Prigozhin may be getting an urge to go up to the 5th floor.  They also might be telegraphing the reasons the Ukrainians are still holding out in Bakhmut, to allow the Russians to stick their neck out and cut it off with a counter attack.

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A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. Russian political scientist Aleksey Mukhin—who contributes to the Valdai Discussion Club and Russian state media—commented on Prigozhin’s March 11 sarcastic announcement that he will be running in the Ukrainian presidential election in 2024.[1] Mukhin stated on his Telegram channel that the Russian public began to interpret Prigozhin’s statement as an announcement that he will run for the Russian presidential elections, which are also scheduled for 2024. Mukhin rhetorically asked if Prigozhin notified Russian President Vladimir Putin about his “presidential ambitions.” Mukhin argued that Prigozhin’s presentation of himself as the “commander” of the Wagner private military company (PMC) “directly affects the planning and management of the assault squads’ combat operations.” Mukhin also sarcastically stated that Prigozhin is a “prospective politician” who searches for scapegoats to blame for Wagner’s high losses among personnel. Mukhin observed that everyone knows that the Russian government pays for Prigozhin’s forces and their ammunition and stated that Prigozhin’s failure to acknowledge the support from conventional Russian forces alienated him from other Russian battlefield commanders. Mukhin concluded that Prigozhin “has placed the Wagner fighters in danger of encirclement during the expected Ukrainian counterattack” as a result of his actions. Mukhin stated that Prigozhin now is demanding that Russian conventional forces “cover his flanks,” and that Russian forces may need to put aside their distaste for Prigozhin to prevent further Wagner losses in Bakhmut.

In somewhat related areas (China - Saudi Arabia - Iran): 

U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal

    https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/13/china-middle-east-deal-00086888

For some reason the article above doesn't really say what the deal was:

Chinese-brokered deal that allows Iran and Saudi Arabia to reestablish diplomatic relations after seven years of hostility.

Xi is scheduled to talk to Zelenskyy (probably pushing his peach deal, which likely will not go over well with Zelenskyy). 

China, the bringer of peace... and good financing terms.

In reply to stroker :

Was looking for the Tucker Carlson byline at the head of that prose. "Don't believe anything you see, hear or are told, so that I can go ahead and do whatever I want." Turns out to be quite an effective gambit.

Well, this should be interesting: Russian jet collides with US drone over the Black Sea.

 "unprofessional act by the Russians".

The engagement began with the Su-27s fighter jets dumping fuel on the drone in a "reckless, environmentally unsound and unprofessional manner".

Uhm, yeah.   That is pretty much an attack.... in international airspace.

Talk about escalation.  Not super surprising based on the level of professionalism that has historically been seen from Russian pilots (regularly getting way to close to western ships / planes)

Not sure what they thought dumping fuel on it would do.  It would pretty instantly turn into a mist and might make the drone run a bit rich for a while!  I am guessing they tried to get close enough so the fuel didn't vaporize, which would basically be impossible.

Here is a pic of an airliner dumping fuel to give you an idea:

Depending on how the SU27 dumps fuel (and it is a similar layout to the F111), they may have been doing this (which would also be super ineffective unless VERY close):

Shashank Joshi, defence editor for the Economist magazine, said the Russians may have been trying to intimidate the drone as it was hoovering up their communications.

That's like kicking and yelling at a vending machine.